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ABSTRACT
This thesis consists of three papers, two studying the effectiveness of policy inter-
ventions curbing the opioid crisis, and one studying the value of network ties in the
Chinese bureaucracy. The two chapters on the opioid crisis are coauthored with
Daniel Guth, a fellow Caltech graduate student.
The first chapter studies the effectiveness of theOxyContin reformulation in reducing
opioid misuse and overdose. Purdue Pharma reformulated OxyContin in 2010 to
make it more difficult to abuse. Previous research argued that OxyContin misuse
fell dramatically and OxyContin users switched directly to heroin. Using a novel
and fine-grained source of all oxycodone sales from 2006-2014, we show that the
reformulation led users to substitute from OxyContin to generic oxycodone and the
reformulation had no overall impact on opioid or heroin mortality. In addition, the
chapter finds that generic oxycodone, instead of OxyContin, was the driving factor
in the transition to heroin in recent years. These findings highlight the important
role generic oxycodone played in the opioid epidemic and the limited effectiveness
of a partial supply-side intervention.
The second chapter studies the spatial spillover effect of Prescription Drug Mon-
itoring Programs (PDMPs). PDMPs seek to potentially reduce opioid misuse by
restricting the sale of opioids in a state. This chapter examines discontinuities along
state borders, where one side may have a PDMP and the other side may not. We
find that electronic PDMP implementation, whereby doctors and pharmacists can
observe a patient’s opioid purchase history, reduces a state’s opioid sales but in-
creases opioid sales in neighboring counties on the other side of the state border.
We also find systematic differences in opioid sales and mortality between border
counties and interior counties. These differences decrease when neighboring states
both have PDMPs, which is consistent with the hypothesis that the differences were
caused by cross-border opioid shopping. Our work highlights the importance of
understanding the opioid market as connected across counties or states, as we show
that states are affected by the opioid policies of their neighbors.
The third chapter examines the value of patronage ties at lower levels of Chinese
bureaucracy. A growing literature shows that connection with the right higher-level
politicians is beneficial for advancements in the Communist Party of China. In this
chapter, I use a self-collected data set to examine the value of patronage ties in the city
v
committees, a previously overlooked but important level of the Chinese government.
I present empirical evidence that the party secretaries are involved in the appointment
of committee members. But upon departure, the party secretaries’ career success
does not improve the committee members’ future promotion likelihood. This work
highlights that the value of interpersonal connection in China is highly dependent
on which level of the government is under inspection.
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C h a p t e r 1
THE OXYCONTIN REFORMULATION REVISITED: NEW
EVIDENCE FROM IMPROVED DEFINITIONS OF MARKETS
AND SUBSTITUTES
1.1 Introduction
Since 1999, the opioid epidemic has claimed more than 415,000 American lives
(CDC Wonder). What started with fewer than 6,000 opioid-related deaths in 1999
grew steadily every year until fatalities reached 47,573 deaths in 2017. Following
a small decline in fatal drug overdoses in 2018, death rates continue to rise. Over
the past two decades, millions of Americans have misused prescription opioids
or progressed to more potent opioids, first heroin and later fentanyl. Many social
scientists have tried to understand how this crisis has grown over two decades despite
significant public health efforts to the contrary.
Doctors and health economists have long argued that the drug most responsible for
prescription opioid overdose deaths, and the key to understanding the transition from
prescription opioids to heroin starting in 2010, was OxyContin. Previous research
(Van Zee, 2009), court proceedings (Meier, 2007), and books (Macy, 2018; Meier,
2003) has documented how Purdue Pharma’s marketing campaign for OxyContin
downplayed the risk of addiction starting in 1996. Since then, according to the
National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH), millions of Americans have
misused it. A key question in this area is whether or not making prescription opioids,
especially OxyContin, more difficult to abuse will reduce overdose deaths.
In this paper, we show that restricting access to OxyContin led many users to switch
to generic oxycodone but had no impact on opioid or heroin mortality. Earlier
analyses attributing opioid overdose deaths in the late 2000s and the subsequent
rise in heroin deaths to OxyContin are incomplete because they omit generic oxy-
codone. Our analysis shows that the misuse of generic oxycodone was prevalent
before the reformulation that restricted OxyContin access, and was even more so
afterward. We also show that heroin overdose deaths increased in areas with high
generic oxycodone exposure, not high OxyContin exposure, two years after the
OxyContin reformulation. In addition, we show that omitting generic oxycodone in
our regressions recovers the results of the literature.
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This analysis was not possible until one year ago when The Washington Post won
a court order and published the complete Automation of Reports and Consolidated
Orders System (ARCOS). The ARCOS tracks the manufacturer, the distributor, and
the pharmacy of every pain pill sold in the United States. The newly released data
allow us to analyze what happened to sales of generic oxycodone and OxyContin
when OxyContin suddenly became more difficult to abuse. The previous literature
focused on analyzing OxyContin because of Purdue’s notorious role in the opioid
crisis. However, the newdata shows that the sales ofOxyContinwas only a small part
of the sales of all prescription opioids: in terms of the number of pills, OxyContin
was 3% of all oxycodone pills sold from 2006 to 2012; in terms of morphine
milligram equivalents (MME), OxyContin has closer to 20% market share over
this period. The new transaction-level ARCOS data allows us to track the sales of
generic oxycodone and fill in the narrative gaps of how the opioid crisis progressed
in the United States.
Following Alpert, Powell and Pacula (2018), Evans, Lieber and Power (2019), and
Cicero and Ellis (2015), we treat the introduction of an abuse-deterrent formulation
(ADF) of OxyContin as an exogenous shock that should only affect people who
seek to bypass the extended-release mechanism for a more immediate high. We
construct measures of exposure by combining ARCOS sales and the NSDUH data
on drug misuse. The NSDUH is the best survey of people who use drugs at the state
level, and by combining it with local sales, we can capture any variation in drug use
within the state. We leverage this variation in OxyContin and generic oxycodone
exposure to examine how the reformulation affected OxyContin sales, generic oxy-
codone sales, opioid mortality, and heroin mortality. Our first contribution is that we
fix the omitted-variable problem by differentiating between OxyContin and generic
oxycodone, and we show that this leads to different conclusions than what pre-
vious literature suggests. Our second contribution is disaggregating the data to
metropolitan statistical area (MSA), which allows us to address endogeneity at the
state level.
To preview our results, we find strong evidence of substitution from OxyContin to
generic oxycodone immediately after the reformulation. This substitution was larger
in places that had more OxyContin misuse pre-reform, which is consistent with our
hypothesis that users would switch between oxycodones rather than move on to
heroin. Because this substitution should be concentrated among people misusing
OxyContin, the results imply large changes in consumption at the individual level.
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Back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that 68% of the decline in OxyContin
sales was substituted to oxycodone in MSAs with high OxyContin misuse. The
findings are consonant with surveys like Havens et al. (2014), Coplan et al. (2013),
and Cassidy et al. (2014) who all document substitution to generic oxycodone after
the reformulation by people seeking to bypass the ADF. We also find suggestive
evidence of substitution from generic oxycodone to OxyContin after the reformula-
tion in places where generic oxycodone misuse was high, a channel that has been
unexplored in previous research.
Our event study approach also shows that generic oxycodone exposure is predictive
of future heroin overdose deaths whereas OxyContin exposure is not. The results
are not contingent on methodology or our construction of exposure measures. Cru-
cially, if we run the same exact regressions at the state or MSA level and omit
generic oxycodone, we recover the results of the literature where OxyContin misuse
appears to be significantly predictive of future heroin overdose deaths. We find that
every standard deviation increase in generic oxycodone exposure pre-reformulation
is associated with a 40.8% increase in heroin mortality in 2012 from the 2009
baseline level. As further evidence against the argument that there was immediate
substitution from OxyContin to heroin after the reformulation, we note that in all of
our regressions, the increase in heroin deaths was not statistically significant until
2012. As suggested in O’Donnell, Gladden and Seth (2017), the rise in heroin
deaths can be attributed in part to an increase in the supply of heroin as well as the
introduction of fentanyl into heroin doses.
Our findings highlight the pitfalls of omitting important substitutes to OxyContin in
analyzing the prescription opioid crisis. Purdue Pharma has received well-deserved
attention over the years for its role in igniting the crisis. The company has been
involved in many lawsuits over the years, but perhaps the most damaging were
lesser-known cases that involved losing its patent in 20041 which cleared the way
for a rapid increase in generic oxycodone sales in the early 2000s. While Purdue
Pharma was being sued and scrutinized, several manufacturers took the opportunity
to fill in the gaps of OxyContin. By 2006, generic oxycodone outsold OxyContin
by more than 3-to-1 after accounting for pill dosage differences. This paper sheds
lights on the role generic oxycodone played and continues to play in the opioid
crisis and helps policy makers update their picture of the opioid use disorder (OUD)
landscape.
1Federal ruling, risk management plan proposals for generic oxycodone
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The paper also calls attention to the limited effectiveness of a partial supply-side
intervention to curb OUD. Purdue Pharma was once a dominant player in the opioid
market, but by the time of the reformulation, that dominance had vanished and it
was only one of the many manufacturers whose drugs were actively misused by
Americans. Purdue was the first company to include abuse-deterrent formulation
(ADF) in their opioids, and it was not until recent years that other brands started
adding anti-deterrent compounds to their products (Pergolizzi et al., 2018). When
substitutions to other abusable opioids are easy, cutting supplies of one kind is less
effective.
The rest of the paper runs as follows. Section 1.2 gives more background on the
opioid crisis and explains how previous research has characterized the OxyContin
reformulation. In Section 1.3, we describe the new ARCOS sales database, the
NSDUH misuse data, the NVSS mortality data, as well as our constructed misuse
measure and descriptive statistics. Section 1.4 describes our empirical strategy for
testing our hypotheses. Section 1.5 discusses our results and what it means for our
understanding of the transition between illicit drugs, and Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Background and Literature Review
This section proceeds in chronological order. First, we provide a history of oxy-
codone and its most important formulation, OxyContin. We then describe the
OxyContin reformulation in 2010 and what it meant for prescription opioid misuse,
as well as how the previous literature analyzed the reformulation. Next, we present
the nascent research on substitution between different opioids and how our contri-
bution fits in this strain of work. We conclude with a summary of the literature on
heroin mortality in the early 2010s and its link with the prescription opioid crisis.
Oxycodone was first marketed in the United States as Percodan by DuPont Phar-
maceuticals in 1950. It quickly found to be as addictive as morphine (Bloomquist,
1963), and in 1965, California placed it on the triplicate prescription form (Quinn,
1965).2 Before the 1990s, doctors were hesitant to prescribe oxycodone to non-
terminally ill patients due to its high abuse potential (DeWeerdt, 2019). The sales of
oxycodone-based pain relievers did not take off until themassmarketing of OxyCon-
tin, Purdue’s patented oxycodone-based painkiller. OxyContin was first approved
by the FDA in 1995. The drug’s innovation was an ‘extended-release’ formula,
2Triplicate programs required pharmacists to send a copy to the government, and Origins of the
Opioid Crisis and Its Enduring Impacts (N.d.) show that these had a persisting effect on reducing
the number of opioid prescriptions.
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which allowed the company to pack a higher concentration of oxycodone into each
OxyContin pill and the patients to take the pills every 12 hours instead of 8 hours.
OxyContin’s original label, approved by the FDA, stated that the “delayed absorp-
tion, as provided by OxyContin tablets, is believed to reduce the abuse liability of a
drug.” In 2001, the FDA changed OxyContin’s label to include stronger warnings
about the potential for abuse and Purdue agreed to implement a Risk Management
Program to try and reduce OxyContin misuse.3
OxyContin was one of the first opioids marketed specifically for non-cancer pain.
In the early 1990s, pain started to enter the medical discussion as the ‘fifth vital
sign’ and something to be managed. As described in Meier (2003), Van Zee (2009),
and elsewhere, Purdue’s sales representatives pushed OxyContin and were told to
downplay the risk of addiction. Quinones (2015) describes how Purdue cited a 1980
short letter published in the New England Journal of Medicine describing extremely
low rates of opioid addiction among hospital patients undergoing hospital stays, but
the company repeatedly implied that this result extended to the general population or
to individuals who left the hospital with take-home prescriptions of OxyContin. The
short letter was uncritically or incorrectly cited 409 times as evidence that addiction
was rare with long-term opioid therapy (Leung et al., 2017). As a result of Purdue’s
aggressive marketing and downplaying of the drug’s abuse potential, OxyContin
was a huge financial success and effectively catalyzed the prescription opioid crisis.
In May 2007, Purdue signed a guilty plea for misleading the public about the risk
of OxyContin and paid more than $600 million in fines. Less than six months later,
the company applied to the FDA for approval of a new reformulated version of
OxyContin that included a chemical to make it more difficult to crush and misuse
(Rappaport, 2009). Although not completely effective in reducing misuse, it was
approved by the FDA and after August 2010, it accounted for all OxyContin sales
in the United States. Until 2016, with Mallinrockdt’s Xtampza ER, Purdue was the
only prescription opioidmanufacturer tomake abuse-deterrent oxycodone pills. The
majority of all oxycodone sold over this time was generic oxycodone that remained
abusable.4
Most research shows that OxyContin misuse fell following the reformulation. As
described in Cicero and Ellis (2015), although some users were able to circumvent
3From the FDA Opioid Timeline.
4Many other companies attempted to make abuse-deterrent opioid pills at the same time, as
shown in Webster (2009), but Purdue was the first to market. Adler and Mallick-Searle (2018) and
Pergolizzi et al. (2018) list other opioids with an ADF.
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the abuse-deterrent formulation (ADF) to inject or ingest, the reformulation did
reduce misuse. Evans, Lieber and Power (2019) find that the reformulation coin-
cided almost exactly with a structural break in aggregate oxycodone sales, which
had previously been increasing. Shortly after the OxyContin reformulation was im-
plemented, researchers began to notice illicit drug use moving towards other drugs
such as heroin or generic oxycodone (Alpert, Powell and Pacula, 2018; Cassidy
et al., 2014; Cicero, Ellis and Surratt, 2012; Coplan et al., 2013; Evans, Lieber and
Power, 2019; Havens et al., 2014). Our paper extends the analysis of the impact of
reformulation on opioid use by separately identifying the shifts in OxyContin and
generic oxycodone misuse.
We build upon a rich literature that studies opioid misuse through surveys or analysis
of the aggregated ARCOS reports. Surveys mostly polled either informants or users
themselves (for details see Inciardi et al. (2009)). The best surveys have been
conducted with users in smaller samples at individual treatment facilities, like in
Hays (2004) and Sproule et al. (2009). However, selection bias is a problem for
surveying treatment facilities, as that is a specific subset of patients whose habits
may be different from the overall drug-using population (particularly because they
are seeking treatment). Some researchers have also used the quarterly ARCOS
reports to study national trends in consumption, like in Alpert, Powell and Pacula
(2018), Mallatt (2018), and Atluri, Sundarshan and Manchikanti (2014). The
quaterly ARCOS reports have no information on the market share of each brand of
prescription opioids, thereby restricting any analysis to the aggregate level only. Our
work is closely connected to the second set of papers, but we are able to leverage
ARCOS’s transaction level data to distinguish sales of OxyContin from generic
oxycodone.
This newly released ARCOS data allows us to make two methodological improve-
ments. First, the literature treats the OxyContin reformulation as an exogenous
shock at the state level. This assumption is problematic because each state’s de-
pendency on OxyContin as well as exposure to the reformulation is the result of
the state’s regulatory environment (Origins of the Opioid Crisis and Its Enduring
Impacts, N.d.). These regulatory factors could have an impact on how people react
to the reformulation, and thus create a hidden link between OxyContin exposure
and the reformulation outcomes. Using the new ARCOS data, we can disaggre-
gate to Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), which allows our model to identify
drug substitutions using within-state variations in opioid sales and mortality while
7
controlling for across-state variations in policies and drug enforcement.
The second benefit of the new ARCOS data set is that it allows us to disaggregate
different kinds of prescription opioid sales on a national scale. Previous national
studies were unable to distinguish between these drugs due to limitations in existing
data. The NSDUH survey, the primary data source for drug misuse at the national
level, only documented past year’s use of OxyContin. Death certificates do not
distinguish between OxyContin and generic oxycodone. The aggregate ARCOS
sales group all oxycodone sales into one bin. Because of OxyContin’s unique role in
fomenting the opioid epidemic, it has received most of the attention of researchers.
The literature assumes that the study of OxyContin was equivalent to the study of all
oxycodone. As a result, although non-OxyContin oxycodonemisuse is significant in
size, it has been understudied. One notable exception is Paulozzi and Ryan (2006),
which notes that non-OxyContin oxycodone was a better predictor of state opioid
deaths than OxyContin.
The previous literature also attempts to link the misuse of prescription opioids to the
rise in heroin misuse. Siegal et al. (2003) are the first to suggest the pathway from
prescription opioids to heroin, and they further note a reverse in trend where heroin
users switched to prescription opioidswhen heroinwas unavailable. Compton, Jones
and Baldwin (2016) describes how, by the 21st century, people who initiated heroin
use were very likely to have started by using prescription opioids non-medically.
The most recent works on OxyContin reformulation suggest that the reformulation
played an important part in reigniting the heroin epidemic since 2010. Cicero
and Ellis (2015) and Mars et al. (2014), who rely on smaller surveys, find that
the predominant drug people switched to after reformulation was heroin. Evans,
Lieber and Power (2019) identifies a structural break in heroin deaths in August
2010 that was accompanied by higher growth in heroin deaths in areas with greater
pre-reformulation access to heroin and opioids. Similarly, Alpert, Powell and Pacula
(2018) show that the rise in heroin deaths was larger in places with higher OxyContin
misuse pre-reformulation. However, the evidence linking the reformulation to the
rise in heroin death is not conclusive: other researchers suggest that the sharp rise in
heroin use may have predated the OxyContin reformulation by a few years (Cassidy
et al., 2014; Dasgupta et al., 2014). With the new ARCOS data, we are able to
examine the claim that the OxyContin reformulation caused the subsequent heroin
epidemic in more detail. In particular, we separate the impact of the reformulation
on heroin use from the gradual shifts in oxycodone misuse that are independent of
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the reformulation.
1.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
To estimate the impact of the OxyContin reformulation on opioid use and mortality,
we combine several data sources including sales of OxyContin and non-OxyContin
alternatives from ARCOS, opioid and heroin mortality from the NVSS, and self-
reported OxyContin and Percocet misuse from the NSDUH. Our main regression
leverages variations in pre-reform exposure to OxyContin and generic oxycodone to
identify the impact of the reformulation on opioid sales and mortality. We define a
new measure of exposure by interacting the state-level self-reported opioid misuse
and MSA-level opioid sales. In this section, we describe the three sources of data,
the market definition, and the construction of the OxyContin and generic oxycodone
exposure measure, and we present a summary statistics of our data.
Data
ARCOS and the Sales of Prescription Opioid
As part of the Controlled Substances act, distributors and manufacturers of con-
trolled substances are required to report all transactions to the DEA. This Automa-
tion of Reports and Consolidated Orders System (ARCOS) database contains the
record of every pain pill sold in the United States. The complete database from
2006 to 2014 was recently released by a federal judge as a result of an ongoing trial
in Ohio against opioid manufacturers.5
The ARCOS database has been used previously to study opioids, but only using the
publicly available quarterly aggregated weight of drugs sold (Atluri, Sundarshan
and Manchikanti, 2014) or via special request to the DEA (Modarai et al., 2013).
The newly released full database reports the manufacturer and the distributor for
every pharmacy order. These data allow us to track different brands of prescription
opioids separately, and calculate what fraction of oxycodone sold is OxyContin at
any level of geographic aggregation. We can thus construct what we believe is the
first public time-series of OxyContin and generic oxycodone sales from 2006-2014.
5Link to the ARCOS Data published by the Washington Post.
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Note: We supplemented the 2006 to 2014 data with publicly available aggregate data from
2000 to 2005. The publicly available aggregate data does not break down the oxycodone
sales by manufacturer.
Figure 1.1: Growth of oxycodone and OxyContin sales
As we can see from Figure 1.1, total oxycodone sales increased substantially from
2000 to 2010, with per-person sales nearly quadrupling in the ten-year period.
From 2010 to 2015, sales of oxycodone declined slightly as a result of aggressive
measures taken by the states and the federal government to counter opioid addiction
(Kennedy-Hendricks et al., 2016).
The newly available ARCOS data suggests that the commonly held belief about
OxyContin’s dominance in the prescription opioid market at the time of reformula-
tion is incorrect. The last time OxyContin’s market was estimated was in 2002 by
Paulozzi and Ryan (2006), who acquired from the DEA a year’s worth of ARCOS
data aggregated at the state level. In that year, OxyContin was 68% of all oxycodone
sales by active ingredient weight, and scholars have assumed that Purdue’s mar-
ket share stayed high until the OxyContin reformulation. However, as Figure 1.1
shows, by 2006 when our data starts, OxyContin sales only accounted for 18% of all
oxycodone sold by weight and never got above 35% during this period. The share
is even smaller if we count the number of pills sold, since the average OxyContin
active ingredient weight is 5 to 10 times higher than that of oxycodone from other
brands. The share of OxyContin decreased dramatically from 2002 to 2006 because
Purdue lost the patent rights in 2004. As a result, non-OxyContin oxycodone sales
grew much faster in the early 2000s than OxyContin sales. Figure 1.7 in Appendix
presents the market share for all oxycodone manufacturers by dosage strength, and
Purdue Pharma is only dominant at higher dosages (≥ 40mg). The overestima-
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tion of OxyContin’s importance in the pre-reform period explains why the previous
literature overlooked the role generic oxycodone played in the opioid epidemic.
The ARCOS sales data are the primary variables in our main regressions. We
aggregate sales byMSA, year, and brand. To focus on the impact of the reformulation
on OxyContin and non-OxyContin alternatives, we group all alternative oxycodone
products into one measure, and we will refer to it as generic oxycodone for the rest
of the analysis.6
NVSS Mortality Data
The second outcome of interest in our main regressions is opioid mortality. We use
the restricted-use multiple-cause mortality data from the National Vital Statistics
System (NVSS) to track opioid and heroin overdose. The dataset covers all deaths
in the United States from 2006-2014. We follow the literature’s two-step proce-
dure to identify opioid-related deaths. First, we code deaths with ICD-10 external
cause of injury codes: X40–X44 (accidental poisoning), X60–64 (intentional self-
poisoning), X85 (assault by drugs), and Y10–Y14 (poisoning) as overdose deaths.
Second, we use the drug identification codes, which provide information about the
substances found in the body at death, to restrict non-synthetic opioid fatalities to
those with ICD-10 code T40.2, and heroin deaths to those with code T40.1. Figure
2 shows the trend over our period of study for the two series.
Figure 1.2: Mortality trend
6We acknowledge that some non-OxyContin alternatives are branded and non-generic (i.e.
Percocet and Percodan or later Roxicodone), but the majority of them are generic products. Generic
oxycodone in this paper should be interpreted as all non-OxyContin oxycodone products.
11
The number of opioid fatalities grew in our sample period, from on average 600
deaths per month to 1000 per month. The number of heroin deaths was stable
from 2006 to 2009 at about 200 deaths per month, and then it rose sharply from
2011 to 2015. As we have stated in the literature review section, the cause of the
increase in heroin mortality is unclear. While some papers blame the OxyContin
reformulation, there is evidence indicating that the availability of heroin increased
substantially after 2010 (O’Donnell, Gladden and Seth, 2017).
Since the number of drug overdose deaths with no drug specified accounts for be-
tween one-fifth and one-quarter of the overdose cases (Ruhm, 2017), our measures
of opioid and heroin deaths likely underestimate the true number of deaths.7 How-
ever, the underestimation would not pose a problem for our regressions. There are
variations in how coroners attribute the cause of death across states, but such vari-
ation would be captured by the state fixed effects. In addition, we do not anticipate
systematic changes to each state’s practices due to the reformulation.
NSDUH and Measuring Misuse
We use state-level data from the National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH)
to measure nonmedical use of opioids. The NSDUH publishes an annual measure of
OxyContin misuse, asking the respondents whether they have ever used OxyContin
“only for the experience or feeling they caused” (NSDUH Codebook). As first
described in Alpert, Powell and Pacula (2018), the advantage of the NSDUHmisuse
measure is that it separates out misuse from medical use. However, only OxyContin
is reported in theNSDUH, and there is no equivalentmeasure for generic oxycodone.
Fortunately, the NSDUH reports PERCTYL2, which asks whether individuals ever
misused Percocet, Percodan, or Tylox.8 These drugs are oxycodone hydrochloride
with acetaminophen and have a maximum dosage of 10mg of oxycodone per pill.
The three drugs were popular among users in the pre-OxyContin era (Meier, 2003).
In the present day, the PERCTYL2 variable captures misuse of not only the three
branded drugs but also other generic oxycodone products that are popular on the
street.
The most direct evidence supporting this claim is the fact that generic oxycodone
pills have often been referred to as ‘Percs’ colloquially in the last decade. Many
7Specifically, we omit ICD-10 code T50.9 (unspecified poisoning) from our analysis, and some
fraction of these deaths are due to opioids or heroin, but were not diagnosed or recorded as such.
8Percocet Drug Information. Tylox was discontinued in 2012 following the FDA regulations
limiting acetaminophen.
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news report indicated that generic oxycodone has the street name ‘Perc 30’ but is
in fact not Percocet. The Patriot Ledger reported in a 2011 article9 that ‘Perc 30s’
were the newest drug of choice in South Shore of Massachusetts, saying:
‘Perc 30s are not Percocet—the brand name for oxycodone mixed with
acetaminophen, the main ingredient in Tylenol—but a generic variety of
quick-release oxycodone made by a variety of manufacturers. They are
sometimes referred to as “roxys” after Roxane Laboratories, the first
company to make the drug, or “blueberries,” because of their color.’
Since many generic oxycodone users would not know the name of the drug they
use other than by its street name, but could distinguish between immediate release
oxycodone and extended releaseOxyContin, it is likely that they answer affirmatively
to misusing Percocet when they are, in fact, using generic oxycodone.10
There are also several empirical observations that support this claim. The first is that
we continue to see increases in the lifetime misuse of Percocet, Percodan, and Tylox
even after they were replaced by OxyContin as the preferred prescription opioid
to misuse. The misuse rate of Percocet, Percodan, and Tylox increased 30% from
4.1% to 5.6% from 2002 to 2009 (see Figure 1.8 in Appendix), which would not
have been possible if these drugs, or what people believed were ‘Percs,’ were not
actively misused by new users post-introduction of OxyContin.
The second observation is that, based on the average sales data from 2006 to 2014,
a disproportionate number of people has reported misusing Percocet, Percodan, or
Tylox as compared to the actual sales of the three drugs. The sales of Endo Pharma,
the manufacturer of Percocet and Percodan11, are orders of magnitude less than the
sales of Purdue while more than twice as many people reported misusing the three
drugs as compared to OxyContin (see Figure 1.9 in Appendix). A back-of-the-
envelope calculation shows that if PERCTYL2 misuse captures only the misuse of
Percocet and Percodan, then the proportion of pills misused out of all pills sold is 29
times higher for Percocet and Percodan than the same proportion for OxyContin12,
a very unlikely situation given the popularity of OxyContin on the street.
9Patriot Ledger Link. Other references to generic non-OxyContin oxycodone as Perc 30s:
Phoenix House, Washington State Patrol, The Boston Globe, The Salem News, Massachusetts Court
Filing, Cape Cod Times, Pocono Record, Bangor Daily News, Patch, CNN Op-Ed.
10In the ARCOS dataset these pills are simply listed as ‘Oxycodone Hydrochloride 30mg.’
11Tylox not included since it was discontinued.
12In terms of number of pills circulated, OxyContin is 12.1 times Percocet and Percodan from
2006 to 2014. In terms of misuse, OxyContin is 41% of Percocet and Percodan in the same period.
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This deduction is further supported bymisuse data reported in theNSDUH.Weknow
that generic oxycodone is commonly misused.13 If oxycodone has any other drug
names, the popularity of that drug name in the NSDUH surveys should increase
to reflect the increase in misuse in recent years. In addition to inquiring about
popular brands, the NSDUH survey asks respondents to list any other prescription
oxycodone that they have misused before. Dozens of pain relievers are reported,
but in 2010 “oxycodone or unspecified oxycodone products” was only named by
0.10%14 of the respondents. No other brand of oxycodone pills are reported as
commonly misused. We know from the reports in press and documents in court that
generic oxycodone is a popular opioid on the street, and we know that Percocet is
the only other commonly misused opioid documented in the NSDUH survey. Thus,
the only way to reconcile the discrepancy between these two sources is that people
mistakenly perceive generic oxycodone as Percocet or respond to the NSDUH as
if they do. Thus, we use lifetime OxyContin and lifetime Percocet misuse for the
construction of OxyContin and generic oxycodone exposure measures in Section
1.3.3.
Market Definition and Endogeneity Problems
Previous studies of the OxyContin reformulation depend on state-level variations to
causally identify the impact of the reformulation. Treating OxyContin reformulation
as an exogenous shock at the state level is potentially problematic. Although the
timing of the reformulation is exogenous, each state’s exposure to it is a result of
a combination of the state’s regulatory environment and Purdue’s initial marketing
strategy (Origins of the Opioid Crisis and Its Enduring Impacts, N.d.). These factors
have substantial impact on how people in a state respond to the reformulation, cre-
ating a hidden link between exposure to the reformulation, the identifying variation,
and subsequent drug use, the outcome variable.
One can limit the impact of endogenous regulation by disaggregation, but only
if there is substantial intra-state variation in exposure to the reformulation. Both
the ARCOS database and the NVSS mortality data have great geographic detail.
Conducting our analysis on metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), we find large
13Law enforcement and journalists have previously identified the 30mg oxycodone pill as the
most commonly trafficked opioid, see DEA Link, ICE Link, and Palm Beach Post Link.
14NSDUH Codebook variables (ANALEWA through ANALEWE) list the other pain relievers
reported. Even if we assumed that all 2.49% of respondents saying they took a prescription pain
reliever not listed had taken generic oxycodone, it is still less than half of the reported Percocet
misuse.
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variation in both OxyContin use and opioid mortality across MSAs in the same
state. At the aggregate level in 2009, the average OxyContin market share in a state
is 35.6%. 65 of the 379 MSAs (17.1%) in our sample have an OxyContin market
share that is 10% greater or smaller than their state average. The average opioid
mortality is 0.343 deaths per 100,000 population in 2008. The variation in death
is even more significant. More than 310 (83%) MSAs have a mortality rate 20%
higher or lower than their state average, and more than 192 (51%) have a mortality
rate 50% higher or lower than their state average. We present the full distribution of
deviations of the OxyContin market share and opioid mortality from state average
in Figure 1.10 and Figure 1.11 in the Appendix.
Disaggregating to the MSA-level allows us to control for the state’s regulatory
environment and hence eliminate the most problematic source of endogeneity. We
use intra-state variation in exposure to the reformulation for identification. Intra-state
heterogeneity in opioid use is associated with past economic conditions (Carpenter,
McClellan and Rees, 2017), location of hospitals and treatment centers (Swensen,
2015), preferences of local physicians (Schnell, 2017), and local policy, some of
which could still be correlated with the locality’s response to the reformulation.
Analysis at the MSA level clearly allows us to make a much stronger claim than
analysis at the state level.
In addition, as we will show in the next sections, the disaggregation increases the
statistical power of our regressions beyond the impact of the tripled sample size.
Our results indicate that defining the market at the MSA level better captures the
interaction between drug use and mortality than the state level. The important
variations in drug use, for example between Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana at
4.4% of nonmedical use of pain relievers and San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont at
5.6%, disappears when they are aggregated to the state level (2005-2010 NSDUH
MSA Detailed Tables, 2012).
OxyContin and Non-OxyContin Oxycodone Exposure
Since the OxyContin reformulation was a national event independent of local con-
ditions, we can estimate its impact by comparing the outcomes in areas of high prior
exposure to opioids with outcomes in areas of low exposure. Ideally, we want to
quantify exposure using the volume ofOxyContinmisused in each region pre-reform
while controlling for the volume of generic oxycodone misused. In practice, we do
not observe these quantities. The best proxy in the literature is the self-reported
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misuse rate from the NSDUH.
Based on the NSDUH misuse, we create a new measure of OxyContin and non-
OxyContin oxycodone exposure by combining the NSDUH state-level misuse rate
with ARCOS MSA-level sales. Specifically, for each drug, we calculate:
Exposurepre-reform< = Lifetime Misuse2004−2009B × Sales2009< (1.1)
Our measure is the interaction term of sales of OxyContin/generic oxycodone in
an MSA and the lifetime misuse rate of that drug in the corresponding state. This
new measure has two advantages over the conventional misuse rate from NSDUH:
it captures intra-state variation in misuse and it more accurately reflects the current
misuse of both OxyContin and generic oxycodone.
The NSDUH surveys approximately 70,000 respondents every year and uses sophis-
ticated reweighting techniques to get accurate state level estimates. Once we get to
the MSA level, the number of people surveyed as well as the number of positive
responses to questions on opioid misuse are extremely small. As a result, most of
the outcomes at the MSA level are censored by the NSDUH to protect individual
privacy. Using only the survey data means that we would use same state misuse
value for all MSAs and therefore forgo any intra-state variation in drug use. In com-
parison, our proposed measure relies on deviations from normal sales patterns to
generate variations in exposure rates for the MSAs. Our definition assumes that the
percentage of people that reported misusing a particular drug in a state is equivalent
to the proportion of sales that are being misused. In a state where all the MSAs
have identical sales, all the MSAs will have identical exposure rates by definition.
However, if one MSA has higher sales of OxyContin compared with the rest of the
state, our OxyContin exposure measure in that MSA will be higher than the rest of
the state. This construction of exposure mirrors our intuitive understanding that the
misuse of a drug in a locality is a function of the overall misuse and the availability
of that particular drug in the area.
The NSDUH survey15 reports past-year misuse of OxyContin but only lifetime mis-
use of generic oxycodone. Previous studies did not focus on generic oxycodone
misuse, so these studies rely on past-year OxyContin misuse rates. In our case, to
disentangle substitution among prescription opioids, we have to make the compari-
son between OxyContin and generic oxycodone equal. Resorting to lifetime misuse
rates for both series sacrifices the timely nature of the NSDUH misuse rates. By
15In all surveys prior to 2014.
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combining the lifetime misuse rates with sales in the year before reformulation, we
capture recent changes in the use of both drugs. To make our results comparable
with previous studies, in the Appendix section, we repeat our entire analysis with
OxyContin last-year misuse and generic oxycodone lifetime misuse. Most of our
conclusions stand despite giving OxyContin a more favorable treatment.
To construct our measure, we follow the precedent set in the literature by using a
six-year average state level lifetime misuse rate pre-reform (2004–2009) and sales
in 2009. The goal of the time average is to reduce the variance of the state-level
misuse rates. We check the validity of our measure by regressing opioid death on it
and compare the results with the same regressions on either only ARCOS sales or
only NSDUH misuse. Results are summarized in Table 1.2 in Appendix. The fit
of the generic oxycodone regression is much improved with the interacted variable
('2 = 0.187) relative to using only one with NSDUH misuse ('2 = 0.062) or
sales ('2 = 0.176). The improvement is even larger for the OxyContin regression
('2 = 0.128) relative to using only one with NSDUH ('2 = 0.084) or with sales
('2 = 0.086).
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.1 reports summary statistics for five groups of MSAs: All MSAs, MSAs
with high OxyContin exposure, MSAs with low OxyContin exposure, MSAs with
high generic oxycodone exposure, andMSAs with low generic oxycodone exposure.
MSAs with high OxyContin exposure and MSAs with high generic oxycodone ex-
posure have similar demographic summary statistics. These two groups of MSAs
also are not different statistically in their heroin mortality. Disentangling the im-
pact of various opioids on the rise in heroin mortality is impossible with nationally
aggregated or state level data due to the high correlation inmisuse. The high correla-
tion also implies that regressing heroin death on OxyContin without controlling for
generic oxycodone use will likely lead to an overestimation of OxyContin’s impact.
MSAswith highmisuse differ fromMSAswith lowmisuse. Highmisuse states have
higher sales of both types of prescription opioids (twice as much for both types of
opioids), higher mortality rate (twice as much for both opioid and heroin overdose),
smaller population, higher average age, higher median income, higher percentage
of white population, and lower percentage of black population. The differences in
racial composition repeat well established findings in the literature: prescription
opioid misuse was originally concentrated among white users, and by 2010, new
17



















NSDUH lifetime misuse rates (2004-2009)
OxyContin misuse rate
(%)
2.22 1.88 2.56 1.87 2.56
Oxycodone misuse rate
(%)
5.19 4.22 6.17 3.75 6.64
Annual ARCOS sales (all sample period)
Oxycontin sales per
person
65.71 43.47 88.06 50.70 80.79
Oxycodone sales per
person
181.84 112.50 251.55 99.24 264.88
Annual death per 100,000 (all sample period)
Opioid 0.32 0.23 0.41 0.23 0.42
Heroin 0.13 0.09 0.16 0.10 0.16
Census Demographics (2009)
Number of MSAs 379 190 189 190 189
Population 679878 745327 614082 663740 696101
Age 36.13 34.68 37.59 34.84 37.43
Male (%) 49.24 49.35 49.13 49.40 49.08
Separated (%) 18.83 18.24 19.42 18.32 19.34
High school and above
(%)
84.20 82.79 85.61 83.68 84.72
Bachelor and above (%) 25.36 24.77 25.96 24.85 25.87
Mean income 64213 63414 65016 63058 65374
Low income (%) 35.38 35.79 34.98 35.90 34.86
White (%) 82.17 79.99 84.36 81.22 83.12
Black (%) 11.20 13.09 9.30 11.80 10.60
Asian (%) 3.03 3.47 2.60 3.52 2.54
Native American (%) 0.18 0.20 0.17 0.20 0.17
Note: Simple average, not weighted by population.
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heroin users were almost entirely white (Cicero et al., 2014). These differences
in demographic variables motivate the inclusion of control variables in our main
regressions.
1.4 Empirical Strategies
Our goal is to investigate two questions. First, what was the reformulation’s im-
mediate impact on OxyContin and generic oxycodone use? Second, what was the
reformulation’s long-run effect on opioid mortality, heroin mortality, and on the
progression of opioid addiction?
We follow the event study framework from Alpert, Powell and Pacula (2018) to es-
timate the causal impact of the OxyContin reformulation on OxyContin and generic
oxycodone sales and opioid and heroinmortality. We exploit the variations inMSAs’
exposure to the reformulation due to the differences in their pre-reform OxyContin
use while controlling for pre-reform generic oxycodone use. Our approach is similar
to Finkelstein (2007), where the OxyContin reformulation has more “bite,” or more
of an effect, in areas where OxyContin misuse was higher than in places where
generic oxycodone was the preferred drug. The approach allows us to measure
whether MSAs with higher exposure to OxyContin experienced larger declines in
OxyContin sales, larger increases in alternative oxycodone, or larger increases in
opioid and heroin mortality. The empirical framework is:
.<C = UB + XC +
2014∑
8=2006




1{8 = C}V28 × Oxycodone Exp%A4< + -′<CW + n<C
(1.2)
where.<C are the outcomevariables of interest inMSA< at year C; OxyContin Exp%A4<
and Oxycodone Exp%A4< are time-invariant measures of OxyContin and oxycodone
exposure before the reformulation (see Section 1.3.5 for construction), and are in-
teracted with a set of V1C and V2C for each year. We include state fixed effects to
control for regulatory differences among states and year fixed effects to control for
national changes in drug use. We also include a full set of MSA-level demographic
variables. We weight the regression by population and exclude Florida.16 We show
16The literature excludes Florida because it underwent massive increases in oxycodone sales over
this period, some of which was trafficked to other states.
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the full set of VC estimates graphically, normalizing by the 2009 coefficient. The VC
identifies the differences in sales and death across MSAs due to their higher or lower
pre-reform OxyContin or oxycodone exposure. Standard errors are clustered at the
MSA level to account for serial correlation. In the Appendix section, we present
beta estimations from variations of our base model, which include (1) using a MSA
fixed effect instead of state fixed effect, (2) replacing OxyContin lifetime misuse
rate with OxyContin last-year misuse rate, (3) regressing at the state level, and show
that our conclusion are insensitive to most of these variations.
To complement our results, we also use a strict difference-in-difference framework
to estimate the effect of the reformulation conditioning on OxyContin and non-
OxyContin oxycodone exposure levels. Our specification is:
.<C = UB + WC + X11{C > 2010}
+ X21{< ∈ 86ℎ$GH>=C8=} + X31{< ∈ 86ℎ$GH2>3>=4}
+ X41{C > 2010} × 1{< ∈ 86ℎ$GH>=C8=}
+ X51{C > 2010} × 1{< ∈ 86ℎ$GH2>3>=4} + -′<CV + n<C
(1.3)
where 86ℎ$GH>=C8= and 86ℎ$GH2>3>=4 are the set of MSAs with higher than
median pre-reform exposure to OxyContin and oxycodone, respectively. We restrict
the regression to include only the three years prior (2008 to 2010) and the three
years after (2011 to 2013) the reformulation. The advantage of this specification is
that it does not assume that OxyContin or oxycodone exposure affects the outcome
variable linearly. Instead of having a flexible X for each year, we have only one
X for each of the pre- or post-reform periods. In this specification, we simply test
whether higher exposure MSAs reacted differently to the reformulation as compared
to lower exposure MSAs (if X4 and X5 are significant). We include state fixed effects
to control for state-level heterogeneity, year fixed effects for national trend, and a set
of time-varying MSAs level covariates. Again, standard errors are clustered at the
MSA level.
1.5 Results
We proceed in two steps. First, we provide direct evidence that the OxyContin
reformulation caused OxyContin sales to decrease and generic oxycodone sales to
increase, and that the changes in sales are proportional to the pre-reformulation level
of OxyContin exposure. Second, we estimate the impact of the reformulation on
opioid and heroinmortality. Wefind that high pre-reformulation levels ofOxyContin
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exposure were not associated with high opioid deaths, but there was a strong positive
effect from generic oxycodone exposure in both the pre- and post-reform period.
We find that higher pre-reform OxyContin and pre-reform oxycodone exposure
were both positively but not significantly associated with later heroin deaths, but the
oxycodone coefficient is larger. If we run the heroin regression separately with only
OxyContin exposure, we recover the results of the literature, but running the heroin
regression with only oxycodone exposure better fits the data.
Reformulation’s Impact on Opioid Sales
We begin by showing graphically that OxyContin sales decreased and generic oxy-
codone sales increased in high OxyContin misuseMSAs immediately after reformu-
lation. Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4 present the full set of coefficients from estimating
the event study framework on OxyContin and generic oxycodone sales. Each data
point in the figure is the coefficient of the interactive term of misuse and sale, which
we call exposure, for OxyContin or generic oxycodone in a specific year, and it
captures any additional change in sales in that year driven by high OxyContin or
oxycodone exposure. In Figure 1.3, we observe a larger decrease in OxyContin
sales post-reform in MSAs with higher pre-reform OxyContin exposure. As Figure
1.4 shows, higher OxyContin exposure MSAs saw greater increases in generic oxy-
codone sales post-reform. The effects are well identified at 95% confidence level.
An one standard deviation increase in OxyContin exposure translates into an addi-
tional 21.2 MME decrease in per person OxyContin sales and 11.8 MME increase
in per person oxycodone sales in 2011. These changes represent a 24% decrease in
OxyContin sales and a 8.8% increase in oxycodone sales from the 2009 level. The
effects are economically significant especially given that the reformulation should
only affect the population abusing OxyContin, so this drop in sales is driven by a
fraction of all users. The two observations combined support the hypothesis that
reformulation caused substantial substitution fromOxyContin to generic oxycodone.
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Figure 1.3: Impact of reformulation on OxyContin sales
Figure 1.4: Impact of reformulation on generic oxycodone sales
Figure 1.3 also documents that high pre-reform oxycodone misuse MSAs saw large
increases in OxyContin sales right after the reformulation. This phenomenon has
been unreported previously, but would be consistent with Schnell (2017)’s physician
benevolence hypothesis where good physicians switch patients from oxycodone to
reformulated OxyContin to lower the future risk of abuse. Although the switch
toward OxyContin is smaller in magnitude than the switch from OxyContin, this
increase is the first documented positive impact of the OxyContin reformulation in
the literature. It seems that both physicians and users saw the two types of drugs
as substitutes. Unfortunately, there are not enough MSAs where the switch toward
OxyContin is significant enough that it cancels out the switch away from OxyContin
to examine the possible substitution channel in the other direction.
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Because we include both OxyContin and generic oxycodone misuse in the same
regression, we can separate out the increases in oxycodone sales due to its own
popularity from the increases due to spillover effects from the OxyContin reformu-
lation. Figure 1.4 shows increasing growth in oxycodone sales in MSAs with higher
oxycodone misuse until 2011, and the growth rate declined after. The smoothness
of the oxycodone curve indicates that the OxyContin reformulation had no impact
on how oxycodone misuse affected oxycodone sales. This trend corresponds well
with many states tightening control over opioid prescription policies in 2011 and
2012 in response to rising sales and increased awareness of opioid misuse.
Another way of estimating the impact of the reformulation is through difference-in-
difference regressions. Column (1) of Table 1.3 in Appendix shows the regression
on OxyContin sales. OxyContin sales in all MSAs decreased by 8.05 MME post-
reform, a 9.4% decrease with respect to the average per person sales of 85.6MME in
2009. High OxyContin misuse MSAs had a higher level of OxyContin sales to start
with, but experienced an additional 15.1 MME drop (an additional 17% decrease)
post-reform. Given that only 2.46% of the population ever misusedOxyContin17 and
the reformulation only affected the people misusing it, a 17% additional decrease
in all OxyContin sales would translate into a very significant decrease in sales to
the population that misuses it. The negative and significant Post × High OxyContin
coefficient confirms previous findings that high OxyContin exposure MSAs saw
larger decreases in OxyContin sales post-reform.
Column (2) of the same table reports the regression on generic oxycodone sales.
Generic oxycodone sales per person increased 41.7MME in the post period, a 31.2%
increase with respect to the average per person alternative oxycodone sales of 133.5
MME in 2009. High OxyContin misuse MSAs experienced an additional 10.3
MME increase, which translates to a 68% conversion from OxyContin to generic
oxycodone in those areas. Combining the findings from columns (1) and (2), we see
direct substitution from OxyContin to generic oxycodone in local sales immediately
after reformulation, and the substitution pattern is more pronounced in MSAs with
high OxyContin exposure as expected.
To help our readers visualize the trend of OxyContin and alternative oxycodone
sales, in Figure 1.12 in the Appendix, we break all MSAs into three bins by the
magnitude of the observed drop in OxyContin sales due to the reform. Then, we
plot the per person OxyContin and generic oxycodone sales for the three groups,
17NSDUH, 2010.
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respectively. By definition, the high empirical drop group experienced the largest
decreases in OxyContin sales from 2009 to 2011 (-29%) and the low drop group
experienced an increase in OxyContin sales (+15%). Sales of generic oxycodone
started at different levels, but shared the same growth rate until the reformulation
in 2010. Since 2010, the higher the empirical drop in OxyContin, the faster the
growth in generic oxycodone. The high group saw a 72 MME increase (46% from
2009) in generic oxycodone sales, while the low group only saw a 29MME increase
(29% from 2009). The high growth rate of generic oxycodone in high drop MSAs
supports the substitution story. The post-reform level of OxyContin sales converges
to the same level for all three groups, suggesting that the remaining sales most likely
represent non-replaceable demand for medical OxyContin use.
Reformulation and Opioid and Heroin Mortality
Next, we estimate the impact of the reformulation on overdose mortality. In Figure
1.5, we report the full set of coefficients from estimating the event study framework
on opioid mortality. Each data point in the figure is the coefficient of the interactive
term of misuse and sale for OxyContin or generic oxycodone in a specific year,
and it captures any additional change in opioid mortality in that year driven by
high OxyContin or oxycodone exposure. The OxyContin coefficients are never
significant, suggesting that higher pre-reform OxyContin misuse is not predictive of
either higher or lower numbers of opioid deaths post-reform. The lack of any trend
indicates that any benefit of the OxyContin reformulation on reducing OxyContin
consumption is offset by the substitution to generic oxycodone. In aggregate, the
reformulation had no impact on non-heroin opioid deaths.
Figure 1.5: Impact of reformulation on opioid mortality
24
Figure 1.6: Impact of reformulation on heroin mortality
In Figure 1.6, we report the event study coefficients on heroin mortality. Again the
OxyContin coefficients are tiny and insignificant, while the oxycodone coefficients
grow over time but never reach statistical significance at conventional levels. The
lack of statistical significance is due to the small number of heroin moralities in the
whole sample and high correlations between OxyContin and oxycodone exposure.
If we were to run the OxyContin and oxycodone regression separately (See Figure
1.34 and Figure 1.38 in Appendix), oxycodone exposure had a much larger and
more significant impact on heroin mortality. The results provide tentative evidence
that the higher the generic oxycodone exposure in an MSA, the higher the increases
in heroin mortality. However, the results do not support the alternative hypothesis
that the OxyContin reformulation was solely responsible for the increase in heroin
mortality.
The difference-in-difference results mirror our finding from the event study frame-
work. Column (3) of Table 1.3 in Appendix suggests that opioid deaths are 0.08
higher in high oxycodone exposureMSAs, which is equivalent to 27% of the average
opioid overdose of 0.29 per 10,000 people in 2009. Opioid mortality is 0.05 lower
(17% of the 2009 average) in higher OxyContin exposureMSAs after controlling for
oxycodone use. Higher OxyContin exposure does not lead to higher or lower opioid
overdose post-reform, while higher generic oxycodone exposure is associated with
0.06 (20.6% of 2009 average) more opioid death in the post period.
Column (4) of the same table reports the difference-in-difference regression on
heroin death. Heroin mortality has increased by 0.14 in the post period in all
MSAs, which is equivalent to a 111% increase from the average 2009 level of
0.126 heroin death per 10,000 population. High OxyContin exposure MSAs did
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not experience additional jumps in heroin mortality, while high oxycodone exposure
MSAs did experience an additional 0.07 (56%with respect to 2009 average) increase
in deaths. Again, the evidence from the difference-in-difference regressions indicate
that OxyContin was not responsible for the rise in heroin mortality.
In Figure 1.13 in the Appendix, we show the average trend of the opioid and heroin
mortality for groups with high, medium, and low observed drop in Oxycontin
sales. If the reformulation was responsible for the subsequent heroin epidemic,
then the MSAs most likely to have additional jumps in heroin mortality would be
the MSAs with the largest OxyContin drop. As shown in the figure, the three
groups went through the same explosive growth in heroin mortality (around 38%
from 2009 to 2011, and similar rate afterward), indicating that the rise in heroin
was independent of the decrease in OxyContin sales. This evidence conclusively
rejects the hypothesis that the OxyContin reformulation is solely responsible for the
subsequent heroin epidemic.
Discussion
(A) The Reformulation’s Impact on Opioid Mortality
Until now, the literature has found mixed results for the effects of the OxyContin
reformulation on opioid mortality. In contrast to previous work, we find no sta-
tistically significant impact of the reformulation on opioid mortality as a result of
substantial substitutions from OxyContin to generic oxycodone post-reform. In-
creases in generic oxycodone sales compensated for 55% of the drop in OxyContin
sales in high OxyContin misuse MSAs by our event study framework, and 68% by
our difference-in-difference estimation. Opioid mortality continued to increase in
the post-reform period, but was not driven by high OxyContin exposure.
(B) The Reformulation’s Impact on Heroin Mortality
Our results stand in direct contrast to the findings of the literature. Instead of
being the event that precipitated the heroin epidemic, the OxyContin reformulation
shifted misuse to other opioids, of which heroin was only one. We cannot refute the
hypothesis that some OxyContin users switched to heroin due to the reformulation.
Our analysis refutes the hypothesis that the reformulation was the sole cause of the
heroin epidemic. Instead of OxyContin misuse, we identified generic oxycodone
misuse as a much more powerful driver of increases in heroin mortality post-2011.
What prompted the increases in heroin use is still an unresolved question. Previous
research has suggested an increase in the supply of heroin (O’Donnell, Gladden and
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Seth, 2017) around this time, as well as crackdowns in Florida on pill-mills reducing
the supply of oxycodone (Kennedy-Hendricks et al., 2016).
(C) Bridging the Differences between our Findings and the Literature
One of the innovations we have made in this paper is to shed light on a hidden source
of opioid misuse: the misuse of generic oxycodone. This segment of prescription
opioids was overlooked by other scholars because of OxyContin’s dominance in
opioid misuse in the early years as well as, we argue, the lack of identifiable brand
names for the generic products. Empirical studies based onmarket data or interviews
of opioid users noted thatmany peoplemisused generic oxycodone products (Inciardi
et al., 2009; Paulozzi and Ryan, 2006). Leaving out oxycodone misuse, an important
driver of opioid and heroin mortality that is positively correlated with OxyContin
misuse, would produce spurious regression results.
To show that the difference in findings is not driven by our constructed misuse
measure, or our choice of framework, we test whether we can reproduce findings in
the literature by running all of our regressions using only OxyContin (see Section
1.7 in the Appendix). Our OxyContin misuse exposure individually predicts an
increase in opioid and heroin mortality post-reform as the literature claims. This
finding is the basis of previous studies supporting the claim that the OxyContin
reformulation is the main cause of the subsequent heroin epidemic. However, if
we run the same set of regressions using only generic oxycodone (see Section
1.7), we are able to produce the same findings. The only way to differentiate the
impact of OxyContin from that of generic oxycodone is to include both in the same
regressions. Variations in local OxyContin and oxycodone exposure allow us to
identify the impact of both series, if any exist. As we have shown in our main
regressions, the impact of OxyContin on heroin disappears after controlling for the
effect of generic oxycodone.
(D) Market Definition
Another innovation we have made in this paper is a finer definition of the opioid
market. It is important to consider what we gain from disaggregating to the MSA
level. The specific OxyContin market share in a state is endogenous to a great
many things, including advertising (Van Zee, 2009) and triplicate status (Origins
of the Opioid Crisis and Its Enduring Impacts, N.d.). Although the OxyContin
reformulation was an exogenous shock, its interpretation is made very complicated
because its impact depended on each state’s regulatory history and prescribing
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environment. We do our regressions at the MSA level, where there are unobserved
local conditions that affected sales of OxyContin and generic oxycodone, while
controlling for state-level laws and restrictions. By comparing two different MSAs
with the same regulatory environment but different exposures to the reformulation,
we can get at the marginal effects of OxyContin and generic oxycodone exposure.
Contrasting the state-level regression estimates (see Section 1.7) with our main
results, our main results are larger in magnitude and more statistically significant.
The MSA level estimation of the effect of exposure on mortality is more stable.
(E) Definition of OxyContin Misuse
The literature relies onNSDUH’sOxyContin past-yearmisuse. Tomake our findings
comparable with previous studies and robust to the choice of misuse measure, we
repeat our entire analysis with OxyContin last-year misuse and generic oxycodone
lifetime misuse (see Section 1.7 for results.) As noted in Section 1.3, using last-year
OxyContin misuse gives an unfair advantage to OxyContin due to the timeliness of
the measure. If our findings on oxycodone persist despite the unequal treatment of
the two misuse measures, then it is a stronger indication of the essential role generic
oxycodone played in the opioid and heroin epidemic.
Comparing the two sets of results, we observe the same decline in OxyContin sales
and increase in generic oxycodone sales, although smaller in magnitude. Both
sets of coefficients on opioid mortality become positive but insignificant. Finally,
comparing the heroin result, at the state level we do detect a positive effect on heroin
mortality from OxyContin. In aggregate, our results lose some significance when
we replace lifetime OxyContin misuse with last-year OxyContin misuse. The loss
of significance, however, is in the direction predicted by the unfair advantage given
to OxyContin. This exercise highlights the importance of treating the two misuse
measures equally. When we use measures that more accurately capture recent
OxyContin misuse than recent generic oxycodone misuse, we could mistakenly
attribute the effects of generic oxycodone to OxyContin.
1.6 Conclusion
Researchers have attributed the prescription opioid crisis and recent increase in
heroin use to OxyContin. Previous studies have documented how Purdue Pharma’s
marketing downplayed the risks of OxyContin’s abuse potential, which fomented the
prescription opioid crisis; recent studies identified the OxyContin reformulation as
the event that pushed users to switch to heroin, which precipitated recent increase in
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heroin use. This paper revisits the rolesOxyContin and theOxyContin reformulation
played in the opioid crisis with fine-grained sales data that includes OxyContin’s
most immediate substitute, generic oxycodone. We have three main findings.
First, we find direct evidence of substitution from OxyContin to generic oxycodone
post-reformulation. Our difference-in-difference estimation indicates a 68% sub-
stitution from OxyContin to generic oxycodone due to the reform. Looking at the
decline in OxyContin sales and rise in generic oxycodone sales from 2002-2006,
we believe that this substitution (for different reasons, namely Purdue’s loss of its
patent) also happened years before the reformulation. The size of this substitution,
and indeed the size of the generic oxycodone market pre-reform, may come as a
surprise to researchers. Paulozzi and Ryan (2006) estimate that in 2002 OxyCon-
tin’s market share was 68%. By the time of the reformulation in 2010, it had fallen
by more than half. OxyContin played an essential part in igniting the prescription
opioid crisis but, after losing its patent in 2004, other companies took up the torch
and surpassed Purdue by selling generic oxycodone.
Our secondmain finding is that the OxyContin reformulation had no overall effect on
opioid mortality. In our estimation, the OxyContin coefficients are not significant
in the entire sample period, suggesting that higher OxyContin exposure is not
predictive of either higher or lower opioid death. The lack of any trend indicates
that the benefits of the OxyContin reformulation, if exist, are offset by substitution
to oxycodone. In addition, we do find that high oxycodone exposure is predictive
of rise in opioid mortality from 2011, confirming the increasingly important role of
generic oxycodone in the recent prescription opioid crisis.
Third and most importantly, we show that the heroin overdose deaths after 2010
were predicted by generic oxycodone exposure, not OxyContin exposure. Our main
event-study model shows positive and significant effects from oxycodone exposure
on heroin deaths after 2012, but OxyContin exposure is not predictive of heroin
deaths once we control for oxycodone. The difference-in-difference results are
similar, showing that oxycodone exposure was predictive of heroin deaths before or
after the reformulation, and OxyContin exposure after the reformulation is weakly
positive but not statistically significant. We also do not observe an additional
rise in heroin deaths immediately after reformulation in areas where OxyContin
sales declined the most post-reformulation. In particular, without including generic
oxycodone in the analysis, we recover the same results from the literature that
OxyContin was responsible for the rise in heroin deaths. The evidence shows that
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omitting oxycodone, an important substitute to OxyContin, produces erroneous
results. This paper demonstrates the pernicious effects of generic oxycodone, which




Note: We compute market share based on the average of 2006-2014 sales data. We kept
only the top twenty manufacturers for better readability of the table. The rest of the 35
manufacturers combined contribute 0.18% of total sales. During this sample period,
Purdue Pharma was the dominant manufacturer of high dosage oxycodone pills (≥ 40mg).
In the lower dosage market, three manufacturers (SpecGx, Actavis Pharma, and Par
Pharmaceutical) had higher share of the market than Purdue Pharma.
Figure 1.7: Market share of different opioid manufacturers
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Note: The figure shows the misuse rate of OxyContin (OXYFLAG or OXY-
CONT2) and the misuse rate of Percocet, Percodan and Tylox (PERCTYL2).
Data obtained from annual NSDUH. Percocet was a popular prescription
oxycodone to misuse in the pre-OxyContin period. We see in this graph that the
PERCTYL2 misuse rate increased 30% from 2002 to 2009, suggesting that the
lifetime misuse rate captures more than historical Percocet, Percodan and Tylox
misuse.
Figure 1.8: NSDUH national lifetime misuse rate
Note: This graph shows the difference in oxycodone sales between Purdue and Endo
Pharma. The small market share of Endo Pharma leads us to believe that individuals
misreport the drugs they consume on the NSDUH.
Figure 1.9: Comparison of sales of Purdue and Endo Pharma
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Note: Left is the absolute difference in market share (0.1 means that MSA share is 10%
higher than the state average) and right is percentage difference (10% means that MSA
share is 1.1 times the state average).
Figure 1.10: Within-state variation in OxyContin market share
Note: Left is the absolute difference in opioid mortality (0.1 means that MSA mortality
per 10,000 people is 0.1 higher than the state average) and right is percentage difference
(10% means that MSA mortality per 10,000 people is 1.1 times the state average)
Figure 1.11: Within-state variation in opioid mortality
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Note: We categorized all MSAs into high, mid, and low by the drop in the observed per
person OxyContin sales from 2009 to 2011. The series are population weighted and
Florida is excluded. The high group saw a 30% drop in OxyContin sales, the mid group a
3.9% drop, and the low group a 15% increase. The high group experienced a 46% increase
in generic oxycodone sales, the mid group a 34% increase, and the low group a 29%
increase. The three groups share similar oxycodone growth trends until the reformulation.
Figure 1.12: Opioid sales by empirical OxyContin drop
Note: Similarly to the previous figure, we categorized all MSAs into high, mid, and low
by the drop in the observed per person OxyContin sales from 2009 to 2011. The series
are population weighted and Florida is excluded. No trend break in opioid mortality in
the high drop group. The high group saw a 35% increase in heroin mortality, the mid
group 38%, and the low group 37%. The similar increases in heroin mortality post-reform
indicate that drops in OxyContin use post-reform did not lead to additional increase in
heroin use.
Figure 1.13: Opioid mortality by empirical OxyContin drop
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Table 1.2: Testing constructed exposure measure against opioid mortality
Opioid overdose deaths per 100,000
OxyContin Generic Oxycodone
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NSDUH misuse 10.235 2.909
(1.719) (0.570)
ARCOS sales 0.001 0.001
(0.0002) (0.0001)
Combined exposure 0.093 0.087
(0.012) (0.009)
Number of observations 379 379 379 379 379 379
R-square 0.086 0.089 0.130 0.065 0.178 0.189
Adjusted R-square 0.084 0.086 0.128 0.062 0.176 0.187
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. We report coefficients from OLS regressions
of opioid mortality on misuse, sales, or exposure. NSDUH misuse rate is the 6-year
average OxyContin or Percocet lifetime misuse rate from the pre-reform period (2004-
2009). ACROS sales is Oxycontin or generic oxycodone sales per person from 2009.
Combined exposure is the product of the previous two measures normalized (see equation
1.1). Overdose from 2009. Regressions are weighted by MSA population.
Table 1.3: Difference in difference regression results
Opioid sales per person Overdose per 10,000
OxyContin Oxycodone Opioid Heroin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post -8.05 41.74 0.01 0.14
(2.86) (4.92) (0.02) (0.02)
High OxyContin 47.24 56.46 -0.05 -0.07
(5.78) (13.36) (0.03) (0.02)
High Oxycodone 26.84 95.90 0.14 0.08
(6.66) (15.47) (0.04) (0.05)
Post x High OxyContin -15.14 10.30 0.02 0.03
(6.39) (8.90) (0.02) (0.02)
Post x High Oxycodone -2.33 33.99 0.06 0.07
(6.37) (8.80) (0.02) (0.02)
Number of observations 2148 2148 2148 2148
R-square 0.665 0.737 0.517 0.469
Adjusted R-square 0.654 0.728 0.501 0.452
Notes: We report coefficients from the difference-in-difference estimation (see Equation
1.3). All MSAs in Florida are excluded. In all specifications, we include MSA-level
control variables, state fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered




Note: Data from 2004-2009 NSDUH lifetime OxyContin misuse rate (NSDUH ticker OXXYR).
0.01 is interpreted as 1% of the state population has ever misused OxyContin.
Figure 1.14: OxyContin lifetime misuse rate at state level
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Note: Data from 2004-2009 NSDUH lifetime Percocet, Percodan, Tylox misuse rate (NSDUH ticker
PERCTYL2). 0.01 is interpreted as 1% of the state population has ever misused one of the three
drugs. Percocet lifetime misuse rate on average is much higher than OxyContin lifetime misuse rate.
Figure 1.15: Percocet lifetime misuse rate at state level
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Note: The figure plots the absolute difference in percentile ranking of the two state level lifetime
misuse rates. A 0.1 should be interpreted as a 10% difference in percentile ranking between
OxyContin lifetime misuse rate and Percocet lifetime misuse rate. For example, Colorado’s
OxyContin misuse rate is 0.0063 (42 percentile) and its Percocet misuse rate is 0.092 (97 percentile),
which is a 55% difference in percentile ranking. We rely on the difference between the two misuse
rates to separately identify the impact of OxyContin and oxycodone.
Figure 1.16: Difference in state level misuse rates
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Note: This figure shows OxyContin exposure by MSA. We show Florida here, which had very
low OxyContin exposure/sales, but omit it from analysis because it had abnormally high generic
oxycodone sales with large amounts being trafficked to other states.
Figure 1.17: OxyContin exposure at MSA level
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Note: Florida is excluded in this analysis. MSAs grouped by high vs. low OxyContin exposure and
high vs. low generic oxycodone exposure.
Figure 1.18: Diff-in-diff regression categories
Alternative Regression Specifications
MSA FE
Figure 1.19: Regression on OxyContin sales with MSA FE
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Figure 1.20: Regression on oxycodone sales with MSA FE
Figure 1.21: Regression on opioid mortality with MSA FE
Figure 1.22: Regression on heroin mortality with MSA FE
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Last Year OxyContin Misuse
Figure 1.23: Regression on OxyContin sales with last-year OxyContin
Figure 1.24: Regression on oxycodone sales with last-year OxyContin
Figure 1.25: Regression on opioid mortality with last-year OxyContin
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Figure 1.26: Regression on heroin mortality with last-year OxyContin
State Level Regression
Figure 1.27: Regression on OxyContin sales at state level
Figure 1.28: Regression on oxycodone sales at state level
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Figure 1.29: Regression on opioid mortality at state level
Figure 1.30: Regression on heroin mortality at state level
OxyContin Only
Figure 1.31: Regression on OxyContin sales with OxyContin only
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Figure 1.32: Regression on oxycodone sales with OxyContin only
Figure 1.33: Regression on opioid mortality with OxyContin only
Figure 1.34: Regression on heroin mortality with OxyContin only
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Oxycodone Only
Figure 1.35: Regression on OxyContin sales with oxycodone only
Figure 1.36: Regression on oxycodone sales with oxycodone only
Figure 1.37: Regression on opioid mortality with oxycodone only
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Figure 1.38: Regression on heroin mortality with oxycodone only
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C h a p t e r 2
GEOGRAPHIC SPILLOVER EFFECTS OF PRESCRIPTION
DRUG MONITORING PROGRAMS (PDMPS)
2.1 Introduction
Over the past two decades, the opioid epidemic has claimed more than 415,000
American lives (CDC Wonder). To stem the rising tide of opioid misuse, in the
early 2000s, states began to regulate prescription opioid sales. Among the dif-
ferent policies that were implemented, we focus on Prescription Drug Monitoring
Programs (PDMPs) that require prescribers and dispensers to submit data to a cen-
tralized system. In this paper, we study the effects of states’ implementation of
electronic-access PDMPs, a version of the law that allows doctors and pharmacists
to query the patient’s prescription history in real-time, on different regions in the
same state and on the nearby states. Specifically, we focus on how sales in counties
that border other states react differently to new PDMP regulations from sales in
‘inland’ counties.
Our analysis shows that electronic-access PDMPs reduce prescription opioid sales
and opioid mortality. The effect is economically and statistically significant despite
the fact that endogenous adoptions of such regulations bias our estimates of their
impact downward. We find that border counties (counties that are immediately
adjacent to another state) are systematically different from inland counties (coun-
ties not immediately adjacent to a county in a different state) and the enactment of
ePDMP laws disproportionately affects border counties. These findings are consis-
tent with our hypothesis that the border counties are destinations for consumers who
are doctor or pharmacy shopping due to their proximity to another state. We also
find a small but significant spillover effect in the form of increased opioid sales and
overdose deaths when the neighboring state adopts stricter PDMP regulations.
Using the novel ARCOS data, we confirm the literature’s general finding that PDMPs
reduce opioid sales and mortality. We also contribute to resolving a debate in the
literature about what features of PDMPs are more effective than others. We find
that one specific implementation, electronic-access PDMPs (ePDMPs), are most
effective at reducing opioid sales and mortality. Compared to a regular PDMP, this
version not only requires doctors to submit information, but also allows doctors to
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see what other opioids a patient has received in real time. To the extent doctors
and pharmacists consult the databases, ePDMPs mitigate the problem of individuals
going to multiple doctors or pharmacies to secure opiates. We find that ePDMP
laws reduce per person sales by 0.006 mg in activate ingredient weight1, which is
equivalent to a 5.6% drop from the 2006 national average, and per 100,000 mortality
by 0.279, which is equivalent to a 12.3% from the 2006 national average.
We perform our analyses at the county level, which allows us to measure systemic
differences in opioid markets of inland versus border counties due to the presence
of state borders. Border counties appear similar to inland counties on observable
demographics, but they have significantly higher opioid sales and lower opioid
overdose deaths. These differences are consistent with the hypothesis that border
counties are more frequently the destinations of doctor or pharmacy shopping,
largely because their proximity to other states leads to lower travel costs for out-of-
state residents. This difference between border counties and inland counties falls
after the state adopts ePDMP, which further confirms our hypothesis that a higher
percentage of sales in border counties were trafficked elsewhere for consumption.
Our findings challenge the states-as-islands model often assumed in the opioid
literature.
We also document negative externalities from these ePDMP laws, in the form of
opioid sales and mortality increases in the border counties of neighboring states. We
argue that these externalities come from the demand-side response of individuals
using opioids, who now acquire these prescription drugs from out-of-state. The
substitution to opioids from other states potentially reduces the effectiveness of
ePDMPs as a policy intervention. The spatial substitution identified in this paper
builds upon our previous work (Zhang and Guth, 2021) showing that partial supply-
side interventions, like the OxyContin reformulation, can lead to drug substitution
instead of preventing misuse. In the case of ePDMPs, the policy intervention was
at the state and not the national level, so sales shifted across state lines instead of
across products. This paper adds to the growing literature on the side effects of
supply-side intervention curbing the opioid crisis (Alpert, Powell and Pacula, 2018;
Kim, 2021).
Our work speaks to the importance of not analyzing individual state policies in a
vacuum. Individuals frequently cross these invisible borders in their day-to-day
1The active ingredient weight is equivalent to themorphinemilligram equivalent (MME) divided
by 1500.
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lives, and they may thus be subject to different regulatory regimes. The ability
for individuals to evade one state’s regulations for another extends to all markets
regulated at the state level. One of the policy implications of our work is that
there are costs to regulating opioids at the state level, and there would be benefits
in enacting a national ePDMP. The American College of Physicians has called for
a national prescription drug monitoring program and for standardized PDMP laws
across states until that point (Kirschner, Ginsburg and Sulmasy, 2014).
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2.2 gives a background on PDMP laws
as well as an overview of the literature understanding their effects. Section 2.3
describes the county-level sales and mortality data we use, the spread of PDMP
laws during this time period, and our categorization of border counties. Section 2.4
describes how we model PDMP-border counties as well as our predictions based on
economic theory and known trafficking patterns. Section 2.5 provides our results
on sales and mortality, and finally, Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Background and Literature Review
Our paper connects three different strands of literature. First, we contribute to the
literature on the opioid crisis and policies curbing opioid misuse. Second, we take
methods from spatial economics and apply them to cross-border opioid sales and
misuse. Third but not least, we build upon modern analyses of the effects of PDMP
laws.
The Opioid Crisis and Interventions
Over the past two decades, millions of Americans havemisused prescription opioids.
In 2019 alone, 1.6 million people had an opioid use disorder and 70,630 people died
from an opioid overdose2. Opioid use disorder has devastating consequences for the
individual, the family, and the community. The CDC estimates the total “economic
burden” of prescription opioid misuse to be 78 billion dollars a year.
Many victims of the epidemic got their first access to an opioid from a doctor’s
prescription. Previous research has documented large variations in opioid prescrib-
ing and sales, both within and across states. McDonald, Carlson and Izrael (2012)
shows that the ratio of per-capita oxycodone sales in counties in the 75th percentile
to counties in the 25th percentile is approximately 7 to 1. Their best model can
only predict one-third of the variation in sales by county. Finkelstein, Gentzkow
2The US Department of Health and Human Services on the Opioid Epidemic (link)
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and Williams (2018) uses Medicare data to track individuals who move between
counties, and the paper finds that location has a noticeable effect on an individual’s
access to opioids. The paper estimates that 30% of the difference in opioid prescrib-
ing between counties can be explained by these place-specific factors. Our work is
connected to the opioid prescription literature in that we both study location-specific
effects, but our data is on opioid shipments to pharmacies which occurs further down
the prescription pipeline. We add to this literature by showing that being on the
state border is one of these factors that affect local opioid sales and misuse.
Over the last two decades, states have made repeated attempts to regulate the sales
of prescription opioids in the hope of preventing further opioid misuse. Litigation
against Purdue Pharma, themanufacturer of the drug that ignited the opioid crisis, led
the company to reformulate OxyContin in 2010. The reformulation led to reduced
sales of OxyContin, but spurred on an increase in alternative oxycodone and heroin
misuse (Alpert, Powell and Pacula, 2018; Evans, Lieber and Power, 2019; Zhang and
Guth, 2021). Many states enacted new PDMP laws or tightened existing ones. The
evidence of the effectiveness of such laws is mixed (for more detail see Section 2.2),
and some argue that the new restrictions led to increases in heroin mortality (Dave,
Deza and Horn, 2021; Kim, 2021). Some states, Florida included, passed legislation
that requires pill mills—rogue pain management clinics that were inappropriately
prescribing and dispensing opioids—to register with the state. The pill mill laws
have led to a moderate decrease in opioid prescription and use (Kennedy-Hendricks
et al., 2016; Rutkow et al., 2015). One common theme in this strand of the literature
is a substitution toward alternative drugs when the original supply became restricted.
We add to this literature by evaluating the effectiveness of PDMP laws while taking
into consideration potential spatial spillovers.
Spatial Spillover and Opioids
Our work ties tightly into the literature studying the distribution of economic ac-
tivities across space. Many works have noted how geographic characteristics have
a direct impact on manufacturing, sales, and trade. Holmes (1998) finds sharp
increases in manufacturing activity across the border in so-called ’pro business’
states. Similarly, Nachum (2000) finds that location and agglomeration effects can
explain which states transnational corporations choose to put their headquarters in.
Fox (1986) examines border counties and finds that changes in state taxes can shift
purchases across state lines. Garrett and Marsh (2002) examines lottery sales in
Kansas and estimates that the state lost $10.5 million dollars in net lottery revenue
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to cross-border shopping in 1998. We use border counties, a concept from this liter-
ature, to show how state policy differentially affects different locations. Our setting
provides the perfect environment to test for spillovers because we have detailed sales
data on exactly where opioids are sold, which is not common in other settings.
We also contribute to a small but significant literature on cross-border prescription
shopping. Crossing state and national borders to take advantage of favorable regu-
latory environments to obtain drugs is not a new concept in the literature. Casner
and Guerra (1992) documents patients crossing the US-Mexico border to purchase
prescription medication cheaply and without a prescription. McDonald and Carlson
(2014) estimates that approximately 30% of “doctor shoppers” had opioid prescrip-
tions frommultiple states. Cepeda et al. (2013) finds that 4% of non-shoppers visited
more than one state to purchase opioids, and for individuals who visited multiple
pharmacies to purchase opioids, the median distance between pharmacies was about
12.6 miles. We add to this literature by leveraging decentralized policy change to
systematically identify the impact of cross-border shopping on opioid sales.
Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs
Before any Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs, individuals could freely doctor
or pharmacy shop3, and there was no tools for doctors or pharmacists to know how
many other prescriptions an individual has. PDMPs are state-level databases that
track controlled substance prescriptions in a state. The modern precursor to the
PDMP was California’s ‘Triplicate Prescription Program’ enacted in 19394. The
law required the dispensing pharmacist to fill out standardized forms for controlled
substances and mail a copy to a centralized state repository. The California program
set the blueprint for PDMPs and many states followed suit in subsequent decades.
The legality of PDMPs was tested in Whalen v. Roe, where the Supreme Court
unanimously ruled that storing this personal medical information did not violate a
person’s right to privacy.
These original PDMPs collected information from doctors and pharmacists via mail
or fax, and doctors and pharmacists could not immediately query a patient’s opioid
history. Oklahoma implemented the first fully electronic PDMP in 1990 that directly
and routinely sent records to a state database (Holmgren, Botelho and Brandt, 2020).
3Doctor shopping refers to the behavior of individuals going to multiple doctors to get opioid
prescriptions to evade scrutiny, and pharmacy shopping refers to going to multiple pharmacies to get
the prescriptions filled.
4New York had the first PDMP law in 1918, but rescinded it three years later.
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Currently, the electronic-access PDMPs allow registered doctors and pharmacists
to query the data set in real-time and see all opioids an individual received in that
state. The 21st century saw a wave of expansion to electronic PDMPs and by
2019, all but one US state have implemented e-access PDMPs (Mallatt, 2019). The
next wave of PDMP regulation is the must-access or mandatory PDMPs. These
laws require doctors and pharmacists to check an individual’s opioid history before
dispensing opioids. Absent the mandate, only filling the information is mandatory;
checking a patient’s history is voluntary. The must-access laws are often based on,
and enacted after, electronic PDMPs. By 2017, 19 states have enacted some version
of must-access PDMPs.
Most states do not share any information collected from PDMPs with other states5.
The lack of information sharing made it feasible for individuals to partially circum-
vent the regulation by shopping across state borders. If state A adopted an ePDMP,
an individual would face greater difficulty getting a second opioid prescription filled
in-state. This difficulty could occur either from doctors, who upon observing that a
patient already has an opioid prescription do not write another, or from pharmacists
who refuse to fill it for the same reason. However, an individual could attempt to get
and fill a second prescription in a neighboring state. We aim to evaluate the propen-
sity for individuals to get opioid prescriptions outside of their state, specifically to
avoid PDMP regulations.
There is a wide array of studies on the effects of PDMPs. One typical corroborated
result in the literature is that PDMPs decrease prescription opioid sales (Kilby,
2016; Reisman et al., 2009; Simeone and Holland, 2006) and reduce abuse and
mortality (Patrick et al., 2016; Simeone and Holland, 2006). Some papers note that
certain formulations of PDMPs are more effective than others. Effective features
include monitoring more drugs and updating the database weekly (Patrick et al.,
2016), and identifying and investigating cases proactively (Simeone and Holland,
2006). Bao et al. (2016) looked at 22 states from 2001 to 2010 that implemented
electronic access to PDMPs and showed the implementation reduced oxycodone
prescriptions from ambulatory visits to physician offices by 30%. A set of papers
claim that only must-access PDMPs (MA-PDMPs) are effective in reducing opioid
misuse (Buchmueller and Carey, 2018; Dave, Deza and Horn, 2021; Grecu, Dave
and Saffer, 2019; Kim, 2021; Meinhofer, 2018) which conflicts with existing results
5Lin et al. (2019) shows that in 2014, 23 states had some sort of data sharing agreement, but
many of these agreements were one-way, and only Michigan and Indiana shared this information
with all of their neighboring states.
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on the effectiveness of non-mandatory PDMPs. We contribute to this debate by
showing that ePDMP laws were effective at reducing sales and overdose deaths
during our sample period.
The disagreement in the literature on what features of PDMPs are more effective
than others is partly the result of each paper employing its own categorization of
laws and testing the effectiveness on different outcome variables. Assembling an
accurate policy data set across all 50 states is inherently challenging (Schuler et al.,
2021). Horwitz et al. (2018) point out that the inconclusive and contradictory results
may be due to the large variations in dates used in different studies. Existing sources
of enactment dates rarely acknowledge the researchers’ decisions in creating such a
data set, and the public sources have a large disagreement. In this paper, we use the
“modern system operational date” variable from Horwitz et al. (2018) in our main
analysis. We will elaborate on the choice of the “modern system operational date”
over other implementation dates in Section 2.3.
States adopted PDMP policies at different times, but the literature generally does not
address potential endogeneity concerns. For our regression specification, one par-
ticularly worries that states might be more likely to adopt PDMPs because they have
the infrastructure to make the laws effective. If so, a naive regression’s coefficients
would be biased in favor of the hypothesis that the laws matter but such upward
biases are unlikely. We argue that adoptions of PDMP laws are endogenous to local
conditions but in ways that bias coefficients downwards towards zero rather than
upwards. Specifically, places that are experiencing more opioid misuse or higher
growths in sales or overdoses are the most likely to adopt measures like PDMPs.
A simple difference-in-difference estimation of the effect of the law underestimates
its impact and biases against the key hypotheses we want to test. Our estimation
of the impact of PDMP laws on sales and mortality both suffer from this bias, but
we are capturing statistically significant coefficients nonetheless. Moreover, since
the enactment of PDMPs in a state is independent of the differences between border
and inland counties in that state, and independent of conditions in nearby states, our
estimation of the border effect and spillover will not be affected by the endogeneity
problem.
2.3 Data
In this section, we introduce the data source of our sales and mortality data, describe
our choice of PDMP implementation dates, define how we characterize border
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counties, and present summary statistics.
ARCOS Sales Data and NVSS Mortality Data
As part of the Controlled Substances Act, distributors and manufacturers of con-
trolled substances are required to report all transactions to theDEA.ThisAutomation
of Reports and Consolidated Orders System (ARCOS) database contains the record
of every pain pill sold in the United States. The complete database from 2006
to 2014 was recently released by a federal judge as a result of an ongoing trial
in Ohio against opioid manufacturers.6 The part of ARCOS that we use in this
paper is shipments of oxycodone from manufacturers to pharmacies. In theory, the
manufacturer to pharmacy shipments are not equivalent to sales to the consumers.
However, since pharmacies do not keep large stocks of opioids, the aggregated an-
nual data of sales from manufacturers to pharmacies is practically equivalent to the
annual sales of pharmacies to consumer sales. The benefit of ARCOS data is that
it allows disaggregation to arbitrarily fine geographical levels, which is essential for
the identification of the border effects, and it contains all opioid sales which allows
us to identify spatial substitution. The ARCOS sales data is the primary outcome
variable in our regressions.
We care about how PDMP laws affect opioid sales, but ultimately we are interested
in preventing their effects on overdoses and deaths. The second outcome of interest
in our main regression is opioid mortality. We use the restricted-use multiple-cause
mortality data from the National Vital Statistics System (NVSS) to track opioid
overdoses. The dataset covers all deaths in the United States from 2006-2014. We
follow the literature’s two-step procedure to identify opioid-related deaths. First,
we code deaths with ICD-10 external cause of injury codes: X40–X44 (acciden-
tal poisoning), X60–64 (intentional self-poisoning), X85 (assault by drugs), and
Y10–Y14 (poisoning) as overdose deaths. Second, we use the drug identification
codes, which provide information about the substances found in the body at death,
to restrict non-synthetic opioid fatalities to those with ICD-10 code T40.2.
PDMP Enactment Dates
As discussed in the background section, there are multiple sets of PDMP enactment
dates, and the literature disagrees on which is the most effective in reducing opioid
misuse. In this paper, we consider three sets of dates: (a) the legislated start date (any
PDMP), which is the year that dispensers or prescribers would be required to send
6Link to the ARCOS Data published by the Washington Post.
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prescriptions to a central database, (b) the electronic access date (ePDMP), which
is the year that the PDMP data becomes accessible to the dispensers or prescribers
through a centralized electronic system, and (c) the must access date (MA-PDMP),
which is the year when certain dispensers or prescribers are required to check an
individual’s opioid history before dispensing. In Figure 2.1 in Appendix, we graph
the three enactment dates for each state. Most states started with the most basic
version of the PDMP and gradually adopted e-access in the 2000s. Only a handful
of states adopted must-access PDMP during our time period.
We use ePDMP dates in our main regression analysis. The reasons are twofold.
First, ePDMPs have a large impact on prescriptions and sales both conceptually
and empirically. Conceptually, an ePDMP streamlines the process by which the
prescribers and dispensers check a patient’s prescription history. Before an ePDMP,
prescribers and dispensers were required to report opioid prescriptions but could
not easily tell what other prescriptions an individual had. ePDMPs allows them
to check a patient’s opioid history online in real-time, so they could more easily
refuse opioids to questionable patients. Although an ePDMP is less restrictive than
a MA-PDMP, it is reasonable to assume that a large number of doctors who are
conscious of the severity of the opioid crisis would have taken advantage of the
electronic system when it became available. Empirically, Horwitz et al. (2018) finds
this set of dates is most correlated with reductions in opioid sales after comparing it
with 9 other sets of dates7.
Second, our sample period has a higher coverage of enactment of ePDMP as com-
pared to the other two dates. There is reasonable consensus in the literature that
each wave of new PDMP legislation tightens the legal supply of opioids and reduces
misuse (although the literature disagrees on which version is the most effective).
Given that each round of legislation may have some impact, we want to work with
the one that gives us the most identification power. The switch from no PDMP to
any PDMP happened in the 1990s and early 2000s, and by 2006, the start of our
sample period, 31 states have already adopted it. The adoption of ePDMPs took
place mainly during our sample period: 37 states adopted ePDMP between 2006
and 2014. Only 10 states enacted MA-PDMP during our sample period. Working
with ePDMPs allows us to use data from more states to estimate the impact of the
law. Our V estimations would be less reliant on trends from a few states.
7The paper did not compare ePDMP with MA-PDMP.
59
Our ePDMP dates are obtained from Horwitz et al. (2018)8. We use Horwitz as
our main source because this paper is the most systematic methodological paper
on PDMP implementation timing that we have reviewed. In robustness, we use
ePDMP dates published by the Prescription Drug Abuse Policy System (PDAPS),
an organization funded by the National Institute on Drug Abuse to track state laws
related to prescription opioid abuse. To check if other PDMP laws have similar
spillover effects, we use any PDMP dates from Horwitz et al. (2018) and MA-
PDMP dates from Sacks et al. (2021). We list all sets of dates in Table 2.4 in the
Appendix.
Defining Border Counties and Assigning ePDMP Status
We define a border county as a county that neighbors at least one county in an
adjacent state and an inland county as a county that borders only counties of the
same state. After excluding Alaska, Hawaii9, and Florida10 from our data, we have
2906 counties, 37.3% of which are border counties (see Figure 2.2 in Appendix
for a visual representation of border and inland counties). For each inland county,
we document whether an ePDMP law has been implemented. For each border
county, we document whether a law has been implemented in that state and the
bordering state(s). If a county is bordering multiple states and these states have
different ePDMP statuses, the nearby law of the county will be the ePDMP status
under which the majority of the nearby population live11. We only need to do this
calculation on 653 county-year observations, which is 6.6% of all border county-year
observations. See Figure 2.3 in Appendix for an example of the calculation.
The transition from states not having an ePDMP to having an ePDMP is key to our
identification. During our sample period, over 60% of all counties transitioned from
no ePDMP to ePDMP (see adoption rate in Figure 2.4 in Appendix). Identification
of border coefficients relies on law change in a county and law changes in nearby
border counties. The majority of the transitions in border counties also took place
8The authors coined their e-access dates the “modern system operational date.” Although the
naming is different, the two definitions are conceptually identical.
9Alaska and Hawaii neighbor no US states.
10Florida experienced a dramatic rise in opioid supply in the 2000s, and then a significant drop
due to crackdown on pill mills in 2010–2011. It is common practice in the literature to exclude
Florida from the analysis.
11The underlying idea is that the ePDMP status of more populous nearby counties would have a
bigger impact on my county than the ePDMP status of less populous nearby counties. Specifically,
we sum up the population adjacent to a border county by ePDMP status. If more nearby population
resides under the states with PDMP law than no law, the county’s nearby law variable will be 1; if
more nearby population resides under the states with no law, it will be 0.
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during our sample period: over 80% of border counties had no ePDMP regulations
in 2006 and that number decreases to less than 20% by the end of 2014 (see detailed
transitions in Figure 2.5 in Appendix).
Summary Statistics
Since we are comparing border counties to inland counties of the same state, it is
important that we acknowledge any potential differences between the two sets of
counties, especially those associated with opioid use. In Table 2.1, we document
the population-weighted average of opioid sales, mortality, and important demo-
graphics, and ePDMP coverage of the two sets of counties. Border counties have a
significantly higher level of opioids sales throughout the sample period. They have
lower levels of opioid mortality in 2006, but the difference loses significance since
2010. We will discuss these differences in outcome variables in our hypotheses
and result section. The two sets of counties are quite similar on all demographic
dimensions. Since some of these demographic factors are associated with higher
levels of opioid misuse, it is important we control for demographic differences in
our regressions.
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Sales per person (2006) 0.101 0.113 0.095 3.28e-11
Sales per person (2010) 0.163 0.185 0.150 0.004
Sales per person (2014) 0.158 0.181 0.145 0
Opioid overdose per 10,000
(2006)
2.22 2.01 2.33 0.003
Opioid overdose per 10,000
(2010)
3.35 3.29 3.38 0.574
Opioid overdose per 10,000
(2014)
3.84 4.02 3.75 0.164
Demographics (2009)
Population 98,853 92,914 102,392 0.397
Average Age 36.11 36.8 35.7 0.149
Male (%) 49.2 49.0 49.3 1.53e-07
Separated (%) 18.2 18.6 18.1 0.001
High School and above (%) 83.4 83.9 83.1 0.002
Bachelor and above (%) 27.4 27.2 27.6 0.004
Mean income 70,130 71,063 69,625 0.05
Low income (%) 33.2 33.3 33.2 0.703
White (%) 78.6 79.0 78.4 0.279
Black (%) 12.8 13.6 12.4 0.015
Asian (%) 4.94 3.87 5.51 0
Native American (%) 0.178 0.141 0.197 8.41e-05
PDMP-related statistics
Number of counties 2906 1085 1821
Have ePDMP by 2006 (%) 18.6 17.8 20.1
Have ePDMP by 2010 (%) 50.5 52.0 49.5
Have ePDMP by 2014 (%) 87.2 85.1 88.3
Notes: Means are weighted by county population. For opioid-related statistics,
border counties have significantly higher levels of opioid sales throughout the
sample period. Mortality is higher in inland counties, but the difference is not
significant in all three years we tested. Many of the differences in demographics
between border and inland counties are statistically significant but not econom-
ically. The adoption rates of ePDMP laws are similar between the two sets of
counties.
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2.4 Hypotheses and Empirical Framework
Hypotheses
In this section, we lay out our hypotheses and discuss the underlying assumptions
and their implications on the market structure of prescription opioids. We start with
a simplified model with no spatial spillover.
The state-as-island model. Consider states as isolated islands in an ocean. Due to
the separation, opioids sold in each state can only be consumed in that state. Since
county location bears no significance in this model, sales patterns and mortality
should be similar in border and inland counties of the same state after controlling
for demographic differences. For example, San Bernadino County, on the state
border between California and Arizona, should behave similarly to Fresno County,
landlocked within California. Although the adoption of a PDMP is endogenous
to local conditions, a priori we would not expect the law to have differential ef-
fects on border and inland counties. Since all opioids sold locally are consumed
locally, changes in sales due to PDMP laws should translate directly to changes in
use patterns, and by extension, to changes in local opioid mortality, ignoring any
substitution to illegal opioids12. The adoption of PDMP in one state should have no
impact on opioid sales or mortality in the neighboring state. The testable hypotheses
of the state-as-island model are:
Hypothesis 1a: Under the state-as-island model, sales and mortality
patterns are similar in border and inland counties.
Hypothesis 1b: Under the state-as-island model, changes in sales trans-
lates into changes in mortality.
Hypothesis 1c: Under the state-as-island model, adoption of PDMP in
one state has no impact on sales or mortality in the neighboring states.
However unrealistic the above model is, it is assumed in many important studies
on the opioid crisis. States are treated as isolated markets where all pills sold
are consumed locally with the exception of Florida, which most papers exclude.
The state-as-island model is applicable in situations when the spillover effect is
small compared to the main effect, or if the spillover’s impact is tangential to the
main question. The literature has documented many occasions when the state-as-
island model fails. Individuals cross the state border to take advantage of favorable
12We focus on opioid mortality, but as described in the literature review, some papers do find
substitution to heroin following implementation of MA-PDMP laws.
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lottery situations (Garrett and Marsh, 2002); patients cross the US-Mexico border
to purchase prescription medication cheaply and without a prescription (Casner
and Guerra, 1992). The decentralized enactment of PDMP creates differences in
regulatory environments and incentivizes individuals to seek out the less regulated
market. Next, we consider a model with spatial spillover.
The spatial spillover framework. Consider two states not separated by an imagi-
nary ocean. Both opioids and people can cross the state line. As a result, opioids
purchased in one state may or may not be consumed in that state. When individuals
are incentivized to purchase opioids from a neighboring state, their cost of doing so
is highly dependent on the distance traveled. Under these assumptions, vicinity to
the state border has consequences on opioid sales and diversion. For someone living
on the Arizona side of the Arizona-California state border, the cost of travelling to
San Bernadino County for additional pills is much lower than that of travelling to
some inland county within California.
The question remains as to when are individuals incentivized to cross the state
border? Before any PDMP law, patients could obtain multiple prescriptions and
get them filled in the same state with minimal constraint. When states adopt some
version of the PDMP, doctor and pharmacy shopping within the same state becomes
more difficult. However, because most states do not share their PDMP data with the
neighboring states, the cost of obtaining additional pills from the neighboring states
remains the same despite enactment of PDMP locally. As the cost of within-state pill
shopping increases due to progressively stricter PDMP regulations (from PDMP to
ePDMP to MA-PDMP), more and more individuals would be incentivized to cross
a nearby border. By the start of our time period, 31 states had enacted some version
of the PDMP, which means that some individuals would already be going to other
states for pills. Hence, we expect a higher share of the border counties’ sales to be
diverted elsewhere for consumption during our sample period. Because the diverted
pills are not consumed locally, we expect the sales to mortality ratio to be higher in
a border county.
Hypothesis 2a: Under the spillover framework, border counties will
have higher sales but lower moralities as compared to inland counties
of the same state.
Variation in diversion rates between inland and border counties implies that the two
sets of counties will respond differently to new PDMP regulations. When states
enact stricter PDMPs, the local pill shoppers and the out-of-state pill shoppers are
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similarly affected by the new rule. Since a higher share of the border counties’
sales is from pill shoppers, the law change will have a bigger impact on the border
counties. The endogeneity of adoption may bias the overall estimation toward zero,
but should not affect how the border counties react to the law change relative to
the inland counties. In addition, as the cost of local pill shopping increases due to
stricter laws, local pill shoppers are more incentivized to cross the state border, and
hence sales in border counties of the neighboring states would increase.
Hypothesis 2b: Under the spillover framework, when the local state
adopts a stricter PDMP, border counties will experience a larger decrease
in sales relative to inland counties of the same state.
Hypothesis 2c: Under the spillover framework, when the nearby state
adopts a stricter PDMP, border counties will experience a larger increase
in sales relative to inland counties of the same state.
In this stylized model, the mapping from sales to mortality is less direct when
spatial spillover was not possible. With the state-as-island model, the enactment
of a PDMP law puts a hard constraint on the opioid misuser’s ability to acquire
prescription opioids. Assuming no other substitution, changes in opioid sales in
one location translate directly into changes in opioid mortality in that location.
With spatial spillovers, changes in opioid sales in one place may lead to changes
in mortality elsewhere. Since a larger share of the border counties’ sales was
consumed elsewhere, the adoption of stricter PDMP will result in a smaller drop
in opioid mortality in the border counties. The enactment of PDMP in a nearby
state increases sales in the border counties, but should have no additional impact
on mortality, assuming that people traveling to acquire pills go back to their home
counties to consume them. In reality, how mortality responds to a PDMP law
depends on many factors, including the state of the black market, the availability of
alternative drugs, and the ease of getting drugs from the nearby states. Since we
cannot control for all of these relevant factors, we expect the mortality results to be
less sharp than the sales results.
Hypothesis 2d: Under the spillover framework, when the local state
adopts stricter PDMPs, border counties will experience a smaller de-
crease in mortality relative to inland counties of the same state.
Hypothesis 2e: Under the spillover framework, when the nearby state
adopts stricter PDMPs, border counties will experience no additional
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change in mortality relative to inland counties of the same state.
See Figure 2.6 in Appendix for a visual representation of the hypotheses of the
spillover framework.
Empirical Framework
Wewant to test (1) how counties react to the enactment of ePDMP laws, (2) if border
counties react differently as compared to inland counties, and (3) how the adoption
of an ePMDP in one state affects border counties in the adjacent state. We use the
following empirical framework to test our hypothesis:
.2C =UB + XC + V1 Law2C + V2 Border2 + V3 Law2C × Border2+
V4 Nearby Law2C × Border2 + -2CW + n<C
where .2C are the outcome variables of interest: sales and mortality in county 2
in year C. Ideally, because each county has different initial conditions, we want to
control for these conditions to get at the impact of the law change. However, because
the location of a county and its border status does not change over time, any time-
invariant differences between the border and inland counties would be absorbed by
the county fixed effects if added. Hence, we use a full set of state fixed effects UB
and county characteristics -2C as controls. We also add year fixed effects to control
for national changes in drug use over time.
Our coefficients of interest are the full set of V’s: V1 estimates the impact of
ePDMP laws on sales and mortality; V2 estimates the baseline difference in sales
andmortality between border and inland counties of the same state; V3 estimates how
the law affects the border counties differently as compared to the inland counties;
and V4 estimates how the enactment of an PDMP in one state impacts sales and
mortality in the bordering counties of the neighborhood state, as compared to inland
counties in the neighborhood state.
One notable feature of our empirical strategy is that the identification of the border
effects (V3 and V4) does not require any assumption about the exogeneity of law
change. As we have discussed in the literature review, enactments of PDMP laws
are endogenous. When each state decides to implement ePDMP is a function of
many factors, including its regulatory environment, the severity of its opioid crisis,
the current political climate, and many others. These factors are highly correlated
with the pre-enactment level of sales and mortality and the post-enactment response.
If states are more likely to pursue stringent opioid regulations when conditions are
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bad, V1 would underestimate the true impact of the law change. In terms of the
estimation of the difference (V3) and the spillover effect (V4), law changes can be
considered as random events.
2.5 Results
PDMP Law and spatial Spillover in Sales
The full set of V from our main regression is presented in column (5) of Table 2.2.
We start with a simple two-way fixed effects model in column (1). We replace
county fixed effects with the set of state fixed effects in (2) to (5) to estimate the
border coefficients. In (2), we replicate the same regression as in (1) to show that
changing from county to state fixed effects has no discernible impact on the ePMDP
law coefficient. Starting in column (3), we add border status and interact it with
ePDMP law to separately estimate the impact of ePDMP law on border counties.
To ensure that differences in population characteristics between border and inland
county are not driving the identification, in column (4) to (5), we control for county
characteristics (average age, % male, % separated, education level, mean income, %
low income, and ethnicity). These are variables that the literature has characterized
as being influential in driving opioid use and overdose (Wright et al., 2014). In
column (5), we add an indicator for whether the nearby state adopted ePDMP for
each border county. We repeat the same analysis using the alternative ePDMP
enactment dates from PDAPS. The results are documented in in Table 2.6 in the
Appendix.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
V1 - PDMP law -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
V2 - Border county 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
V3 - Law x border -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
V4 - Nearby law x border 0.0004
(0.002)
County FE Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
Observations 26,154 26,154 26,154 26,154 26,154
'2 0.000 0.458 0.458 0.519 0.519
V1 estimates the average effect of the enactment of ePMDP laws on opioid sales.
Before adjusting for differential response due to the location of the county, we
find that ePDMP reduces opioid sales. The coefficient is consistently negative in
all specifications, but only significant before the inclusion of border coefficients.
The border coefficient V2 is consistently positive from (3) to (5), indicating that
border counties start with higher sales as compared to inland counties of the same
state. The estimation of V2 supports hypothesis 2a (spillover framework) over
hypothesis 1a (state-as-island framework). V3, the law and border interaction term,
is consistently negative. Although border counties start with higher per person sales,
they experience a much larger drop in sales post-ePDMP than inland counties in the
same state. The results are consistent with hypothesis 2b (spillover framework) that a
higher percentage of sales in border counties are diverted elsewhere for non-medical
use. Comparing the size of V1 across specifications, we see that the estimated impact
of ePMDP law on sales is largest in columns (1) and (2) and decreases and loses
significance once we interact law with border status. If we do not separately account
for abnormal behaviors in the border counties, the coefficients in (1) and (2) over-
estimate the effect of the law change on opioid sales in a “normal” county. We
observe the same pattern using our alternative e-access dates in Table 2.6.
In regression (5) of Table 2.2, V4 is not well identified. Using our alternative e-access
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date, V4 is significant and positive. We need to be careful in interpreting V4 since
the coefficient is measured with respect to sales in inland counties of the same state.
Suppose A and B are two neighboring states and A experiences a law change. We
have tentative evidence that counties in B that border A experience a faster growth
(or slower decline) in sales than the inland counties in B. The findings support
hypothesis 2c (spillover framework) over hypothesis 1c (state-as-island framework).
Implementation of an ePDMP in one state increases the sales of opioids in border
counties of nearby states.
Putting the coefficients together, border counties start with higher sales, experience
a larger decrease if the local state enacts the ePDMP, and an additional increase if
the nearby state enacts the ePDMP (only if we use alternative ePDMP dates). When
states on both sides of the border adopt ePDMPs, most of the border effects cancel
out. As the difference in regulation disappears between states, border counties
lose their higher-than-average sales and their significance in cross-border opioid
trafficking. In addition, the decrease in sales due to ePDMP laws are driven mostly
by decreases in the border counties. The inland counties experience no significant
drops in sales once we control for the border-law interactions. In the robustness
section, we discuss what impact adoption timing has on how border states react to
the enactment of electronic PDMP locally and nearby.
Translating our coefficients to real terms using Table 2.2, if we don’t differentiate
the border counties from inland counties, (1) shows that the law reduces per person
sales by 0.006MME, which is equivalent to a 5.6% drop from the national average in
2006. Since only a portion of sales are diverted for non-medical use, a 5.6% overall
decrease is large if we translate it into drops in diversions. when we do account
for border status, our estimation shows that the law reduces inland county sales by
0.003 mg in active ingredient on average (2.8%). In addition, the law reduces the
border county’s sales by 0.011 mg in active ingredient weight (10.2%), which is
more than three times as much as the drop in inland counties.
PDMP Law and Spatial Spillover in Mortality
We have shown that the adoption of PDMP laws decreases local sales but has
spillover effects on nearby states. Ultimately, however, what we care about is the
consequences these laws have on actual opioid misuse and overdose. In this section,
we use the same econometric specifications to test what impact an ePDMP law
enacted in a state has on mortality in local and nearby counties. We expect the
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mortality results to be less sharp than sales results since there are many interven-
ing factors between access to prescription opioids and opioid overdoses. Spatial
spillovers, as identified in the previous section, are one. Substitution toward other
alternative drugs is another. The literature has many examples of how restricting
access to one drug resulted in substitution toward another potentially more lethal
substance (Alpert, Powell and Pacula, 2018; Kim, 2021; Zhang and Guth, 2021).
Table 2.3: Impact of ePDMP laws on opioid mortality using Horwitz’s(2018)
modern system operational date
Dependent variable:
Mortality per 100,000 residents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
V1 - PDMP law -0.217*** -0.192*** -0.302*** -0.318*** -0.279***
(0.051) (0.069) (0.075) (0.073) (0.074)
V2 - Border county -0.580*** -0.666*** -0.763***
(0.063) (0.062) (0.067)
V3 - Law x border 0.320*** 0.366*** 0.254***
(0.085) (0.083) (0.088)
V4 - Nearby law x border 0.297***
(0.076)
County FE Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
Observations 26,154 26,154 26,154 26,154 26,154
'2 0.000 0.283 0.285 0.318 0.318
The coefficients on PDMP law are straightforward to interpret. Across the spec-
ifications, PDMP laws reduce opioid overdose. The reduction is economically
significant. Using estimates from column (5), a -0.279 drop per 100,000 people
translates into a 12.3% drop from the national opioid fatality rate in 2006. A nega-
tive and significant V2 indicates that border counties have a lower level of baseline
overdoes rate, which is consistent with our hypothesis that border counties do not
abuse as many opioids but export a high percentage of their sales for misuse else-
where (Hypothesis 2a). Given that the extra sales originating from border counties
are not consumed locally, the adoption of PDMP laws should have no extra impact,
if not less, on mortality in these counties. In columns (3) to (5), our estimation of
V3 is positive and significant. The size of V3 is almost as large as V1 in all three
specifications, suggesting that the adoption of ePDMP has nearly no impact on a
border county, which supports Hypothesis 2d.
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In regression (5), we find V4 to be positive and significant, which suggests that
the mortality rate in border counties neighboring a state with a new ePDMP law
increases faster (or decreases slower) than that in the inland counties of the same
state. We get similar findings using the alternative ePDMP dates (Table 2.7). A
positive V4 does not support Hypothesis 2e that nearby enactment of ePDMP has
no addition impact on the border counties. While the sales results suggest that
people from recently restrictive states cross the state line to acquire opioids from
the neighbor county, the mortality results suggest that these people not only shop
across state lines, but also stay in the neighbor county to consume these opioids.
Validating this mechanism is beyond the scope of the data we have, and we leave it
to future researchers.
The differences in the mortality and the sales results are direct evidence that pre-
scription opioids are trafficked across state lines. If opioids sold in each county are
consumed locally, the mortality result should mirror that of the sales result. How-
ever, we find that border counties start with higher levels of sales but lower levels
of mortality. Enactment of ePDMP leads to additional drops in sales in border
counties, but fewer drops in mortality. The overall evidence supports the spillover
framework over the state-as-island framework.
Effectiveness of Alternative PDMP Laws
To check if other PDMP laws have similar spillover effects, we run our main regres-
sion using two additional dates: any PMDP dates from Horwitz et al. (2018) and
MA-PDMP dates from Sacks et al. (2021). The results on sales are documented in
Table 2.8 in Appendix. The enactments of PDMP and must-access PDMP are not
associated with reductions in opioid sales during our sample period. These findings
are not conclusive evidence that PMDPs or MA-PDMPs are ineffective in reducing
opioid sales. As we have stated in Section 3.2 and shown in Figure 2.1, our sample
period covers very few enactments of PDMPs and MA-PDMPs. Most states had
already enacted some version of the PDMP by the start of our sample period, hence
we only observe PDMP law change in a few states that had been slow in action.
Similarly for MA-PDMP, we only observe law change in the few early-mover states.
The limited data combined with the endogeneity of adoption means that we do not
have enough power to identify the effects of PMDP and MA-PDMP using 2006 to
2014 data.
We identify no border or spillover effects using the two alternative dates. The results
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suggest that identification of the border and spillover effects is sensitive to using the
“correct” PDMP law. On the border coefficient, we know from previous regressions
that the enactment of ePDMPs on both sides of the border makes the border counties
lose their significance in cross-border shopping. Not finding a border effect using
PDMP or MA-PDMP dates further validates our main hypotheses. On the spillover
effect, if the law itself did not lead to a significant reduction in opioid sales in the
first place, there is no reason to expect individuals to cross-border shop.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the effects of ePDMP laws on both the states they were
enacted in and neighboring states. Following the literature, we find that opioid sales
fall in states that adopted electronic access PDMPs. After controlling for border and
spillover effects, we estimate that ePDMP laws reduce per-person opioid sales by
5.6% from the median sales in 2006, a considerable drop because the laws should
only affect the fraction of users doctor or pharmacy shopping. We find that the
decrease was driven by border counties in particular, where sales decreased 10.2%
post-ePDMP. We also find that ePDMP laws reduce opioid overdoses in a state,
with approximately a 12.3% decrease relative to per-capita mortality in 2006. These
findings confirm the understanding in the literature that PDMP laws are effective in
curbing the opioid epidemic.
The decentralized adoption of ePDMPs created opportunities for individuals to
cross the state border to acquire opioids from a less restrictive state. Counties
on the border are more likely to be destinations for doctor or pharmacy shopping
due to the lower travel cost from other states. Our paper is the first to document
a differential pattern in opioid use and a differential response to law changes in
counties due to their proximity to the state border. Before the enactment of an
ePDMP, border counties have significantly higher opioid sales and lower rates of
overdose as compared to inland counties of the same state. When the state adopts an
ePDMP, its border counties experience a larger drop in sales and a smaller decrease
in mortality. In addition, when the nearby state adopts an ePDMP, we observe a
larger increase (or smaller decrease) in sales in counties neighboring the law change
state as compared to inland counties in that same state. The spillover effect indicates
that the benefits of ePDMPs are partially mitigated because individuals purchase
opioids from neighboring states when their state adopts an ePDMP.
The qualitative differences between border and inland counties in opioid sales and
72
overdose have implications for all studies on the opioid crisis. Previous studies
treat each state as an independent market and assume that local opioid sales have
a one-to-one mapping to local opioid consumption. This simplifying assumption
is the correct one to make in many situations. For example, in the study of the
OxyContin reformulation, each state is treated with the same regulatory change.
Spillover effects due to preexisting regulatory or cultural differences still exist, but
they are irrelevant to measuring the impact of OxyContin reformulation on opioid
use. However, in many other situations, where change takes place on a state-by-state
basis, treating each state as an independent market may bias the estimation. In the
case of PDMP laws, not accounting for cross-border sales overestimates the benefits
of the law change.
The spillovers we have identified in this paper have implications beyond the opioid
crisis. We have documented a direct negative externality from having state-based
opioid policies instead of a national one. In a counterfactual world where all states
adopt electronic access of PDMPs at the same time, all states would get the sales
reduction without the increased sales from cross-border trafficking. These findings
speak to the advantages and disadvantages of a federalist system. On one hand,
decentralization allows each state to experiment and adopt politics based on their
own conditions. Information from early adopters could flow to late adopters, thereby
providing late adopters with real-world data on policy effectiveness. On the other
hand, decentralization kills coordination and there is often a cost in failures to
coordinate. Individuals, resources, and businesses are often not confined to one
location. Regulatory differences among states allow entities unwilling to comply to
move to a different state, thereby offsetting the positive benefit of new regulations.
This study is the second in a series of papers using the ARCOS data to better
understand the opioid crisis. The first paper discusses substitution toward generic
oxycodone when OxyContin was no longer abusable due to Purdue’s reformulation.
This paper discusses geographic substitution when obtaining opioids from one










Alabama 2005-11-01 2006-04-01 2007-06-28
Alaska 2008-09-01 2012-01-01 2012-01-01
Arizona 2007-09-01 2008-12-01 2008-12-01
Arkansas 2013-03-01 2013-05-01 2013-05-16
California 1939-01-01 2009-09-01 2009-09-01
Colorado 2005-06-01 2008-02-01 2008-02-04
Connecticut 2006-10-01 2008-07-01 2015-10-01




Florida 2010-12-01 2011-10-01 2011-10-17
Georgia 2011-07-01 2013-05-01 2013-07-01 2014-07-01
Hawaii 1943-01-01 2012-02-01 1997-01-01
Idaho 1967-01-01 2008-04-01 1999-06-01
Illinois 1961-01-01 2009-12-01
Indiana 1997-01-01 2007-07-01 2004-12-29 2014-07-01
Iowa 2006-05-01 2009-03-01 2009-03-19
Kansas 2008-07-01 2011-04-01 2011-04-01
Kentucky 1998-07-01 1999-07-01 1999-07-01 2012-07-01
Louisiana 2006-07-01 2009-01-01 2009-01-01 2008-01-01
Maine 2004-01-01 2005-01-01 2005-01-01
Maryland 2011-10-01 2013-12-01 2013-12-20
Massachusetts 1992-12-01 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 2014-07-01
Michigan 1988-01-01 2003-01-01 2003-01-01
Minnesota 2009-01-01 2010-04-01 2010-04-15
Mississippi 2006-06-01 2008-07-01 2005-12-01
Missouri
Montana 2011-07-01 2012-10-01 2012-11-01
Nebraska 2011-08-01 2017-01-01 2011-04-14
Nevada 1996-01-01 2011-02-01 1997-07-01 2007-10-01
New Hampshire 2012-06-01 2014-10-01 2014-10-16 2016-01-01
New Jersey 2009-08-01 2012-01-01 2012-01-05 2015-11-01
New Mexico 2004-07-01 2005-08-01 2005-08-01 2012-09-01
New York 1972-01-01 2013-06-01 2013-08-01
North Carolina 2006-01-01 2007-07-01 2007-10-01
North Dakota 2006-12-01 2008-10-01 2007-09-01
Notes: Date in the second column is the enactment/legislated start date for any PDMP
from Horwitz et al. (2018). Date in the third column is the modern system operational
date from Horwitz et al. (2018). Date in the forth column is the electronic access dates
from PDAPS. Date in the fifth column is the must-access PDMP date from Sacks et al.
(2021). Table continues on the next page.
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Ohio 2005-05-01 2006-10-01 2006-10-02 2012-03-01
Oklahoma 1991-01-01 2006-07-01 2006-07-01 2011-03-01
Oregon 2009-07-01 2011-09-01 2011-09-01
Pennsylvania 1972-01-01 2016-08-01
Rhode Island 1978-01-01 2012-09-01 2012-07-01 2016-06-01
South Carolina 2006-06-01 2008-02-01 2008-09-01
South Dakota 2010-03-01 2012-03-01 2012-03-01
Tennessee 2003-01-01 2010-01-01 2007-01-01 2013-07-01
Texas 1981-09-01 2012-08-01 2012-06-30
Utah 1995-07-01 2006-01-01 1997-01-01
Vermont 2008-06-01 2009-01-01 2009-04-01 2015-05-01
Virginia 2003-09-01 2006-01-01 2006-06-01 2015-07-01
Washington 2011-08-01 2012-01-01 2012-01-04
West Virginia 1995-06-01 2013-05-01 2004-12-01 2012-06-01
Wisconsin 2010-06-01 2013-06-01 2013-06-01
Wyoming 2003-07-01 2013-07-01 2004-10-01
Table 2.6: Impact of ePDMP laws on opioid sales using PDAPS dates
Dependent variable:
Sales per person
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
V1 - PDMP law -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
V2 - Border county 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.003*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
V3 - Law x border -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
V4 - Nearby law x border 0.003*
(0.002)
County FE Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
Observations 26,154 26,154 26,154 26,154 26,154
'2 0.005 0.459 0.459 0.520 0.520
Notes: We run the same regressions as Table 2.2 using alternative ePMDP dates. The
results are very similar to our main findings: ePDMP reduces sales, but the reduction is
less once we control for border counties; border counties have higher levels of sales and
they experience sharper decline when ePDMP is enacted; enactment of ePDMP in nearby
states increases sales in border counties of the local state.
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Table 2.7: Impact of ePDMP laws on opioid mortality using PDAPS dates
Dependent variable:
Mortality per 100,000 residents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
V1 - PDMP law -0.419*** -0.391*** -0.432*** -0.457*** -0.431***
(0.052) (0.071) (0.075) (0.073) (0.074)
V2 - Border county -0.488*** -0.594*** -0.682***
(0.062) (0.062) (0.070)
V3 - Law x border 0.146* 0.234*** 0.173*
(0.088) (0.086) (0.089)
V4 - Nearby law x border 0.210***
(0.075)
County FE Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
Observations 26,154 26,154 26,154 26,154 26,154
'2 0.001 0.283 0.286 0.318 0.319
Notes: We run the same regressions as Table 2.3 using alternative ePDMP dates. Again,
the results are almost identical to our main findings. Enactment of ePDMP laws reduces
overdose. Border counties start with lower opioid mortality, but experience almost no
drop when the state enacts ePDMP. Nearby enactment of ePDMP has a spillover effect on
the mortality in the border counties of the local state.
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Table 2.8: Impact of ePDMP laws on opioid sales using any PDMP dates, e-access
dates, and must-access dates
Dependent variable:
Sales per person
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(A) Any PDMP
V1 - PDMP law 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005** 0.004 0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
V2 - Border county 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
V3 - Law x border 0.0001 -0.004 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
V4 - Nearby law x border -0.001
(0.002)
(B) Electronic access PDMP (main regression)
V1 - PDMP law -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
V2 - Border county 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
V3 - Law x border -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
V4 - Nearby law x border 0.0004
(0.002)
(C) Must access PDMP
V1 - PDMP law 0.004*** 0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
V2 - Border county 0.001 0.0001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
V3 - Law x border 0.012** 0.006 0.006
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
V4 - Nearby law x border 0.010***
(0.003)
County FE Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
Observations 26,154 26,154 26,154 26,154 26,154
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Additional Figures
Note: The horizontal blue rectangle marks our sample period (2006 to 2014). For ePDMP,
9 states adopted it before the start of our sample period, 16 states adopted it in the first
half of our sample, 18 states adopted in in the second half, and 8 states had not adopted it
by the end of our sample period.
Figure 2.1: PDMP implementation dates by state
Figure 2.2: Map of border vs. inland counties
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Note: This picture illustrates how we calculate the nearby law variable for
Litchfield County, Connecticut (blue) in 2012. The Litchfield County borders
three counties from nearby states: Dutchess County from New York (yellow),
and Birkshire County and Hampden County from Massachusetts (pink).
In 2012, the state of New York has not adopted ePDMP and the state of
Massachusetts has. To calculate the nearby law variable for Litchfield County,
we sum up the population nearby with no ePDMP (294, 000) and the population
nearby with ePDMPs (125, 000 + 466, 000 = 591, 000). Since more people
nearby live in counties with ePDMP, nearby law for Litchfield County in 2012
is 1.
Figure 2.3: Calculating nearby ePMDP status for counties bordering several states
Figure 2.4: ePDMP adoption over time in all counties
79
Note: For the ease of reference, we use the (my law, nearby
law) syntax to denote the ePDMP status of a border county.
A border county of (0, 0) has no ePDMP law and its
cross-state neighbors also do not have one; a border county
of (1, 0) has an ePDMP law itself but its nearby state does
not; a border county of (0, 1) does not have a law itself but
its nearby state does; and a border county of (1, 1) has an
ePDMP law itself and so do its out-of-state neighbors.
Figure 2.5: ePDMP adoption over time in border counties
Figure 2.6: Visual presentation of the spillover framework
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C h a p t e r 3
THE VALUE OF CONNECTION IN CHINESE BUREAUCRACY:
NEW EVIDENCE FROM A SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION AT
THE CITY LEVEL
3.1 Introduction
The Chinese bureaucracy is often characterized as “a structure of authority that is
governed by human relationships” (Pye, 1995). A growing literature shows that
connection with the right higher-level politicians is beneficial for advancements
in the Communist Party of China (CCP) (Francois, Trebbi and Xiao, 2016; Jia,
Kudamatsu and Seim, 2015; Keller, 2015; Meyer, Shih and Lee, 2016; Opper, Nee
andBrehm, 2015; Shih, Adolph andLiu, 2012). The rapid economic growth ofChina
seems to be in direct conflict with the literature’s view that patronage institutions
are inefficient as compared to meritocratic ones (Evans and Rauch, 1999; Geddes,
1994; Ilkhamov, 2007; Mueller, 2009). Is China an outlier in this respect, or is there
more to the statement that the Chinese bureaucracy is characterized by interpersonal
relationships?
In this paper, we use a newdata set tomeasure the value of patronage ties formembers
of party standing committees of prefecture-level cities in China. These committees
are in the middle of China’s administrative hierarchy, between the provincial and the
district governments. They are important building blocks of the CCP’s governance
structure and essential stepping stones for core leaders of the Party1. However,
no previous study has looked at the value of patronage ties formed at this level of
the government. Scholars examine the role of performance at this level and argue
that the CCP uses meritocratic competition for promotion to induce local officials
to produce desirable economic outcomes (Li and Zhou, 2005; Xu, 2011). In fact,
Landry, Lü and Duan (2018) presented evidence that the lower the level, the more
performance matters. In this paper, we examine if the value of patronage ties is
different at lower levels of the bureaucracy.
The connection variable we use is based on assignments into the city committee.
A committee member is connected to the city party secretary—the head of the
1In the 19th Politburo, 3 out of the 7 members (42%) of the Standing Committee and 11 out of
the 25 members (44%) of the Politburo served in prefecture-level city committees at some point in
their career. Source: link to biographies of members of the Politburo.
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city committee—that oversaw his/her promotion into the committee. Similarly to
a network in real life, every individual in the system is connected to someone,
but the value of that connection can vary based on how influential the individual’s
patron becomes. If connections formed in the city committees are valuable, we
would expect that those connected to party secretaries who later became successful
will benefit more from that connection. Compared to the common practice in the
literature, we only test whether a specific type of connection is valuable in the next
stage of the committee member’s career.
We find that relationships formed in the city committee are not carried over when
the party secretary gets promoted. We present empirical evidence that the party
secretaries are involved in the appointment of committee members. The high level
of involvement in appointment, combined with the subsequent years of collaboration
in the committee, paves the ground for a close relationship between the committee
member and the party secretary. Thus ties form, but do they matter? We find that,
upon departure, the party secretaries’ career success does not improve the committee
members’ future promotion likelihood. In other words, the value of interpersonal
connection in China is highly dependent on which level of the government is under
inspection.
This paper makes two innovations over the literature. Firstly, we assemble a new
dataset of thousands of city leaders and examine the value of connection in a
previously overlooked but important level of the Chinese government. Secondly,
we develop an innovative method to measure connections formed at one level of
an organization and test their subsequent value as individuals move out of that
organization. The common practice in the literature starts with a group of individuals
already successful, usually members of the alternate central committee or the central
committee. Scholars then trace backward in time for connections formed in the past
and group connections formed in all kinds of organizations into one variable. This
methodology has two potential shortcomings: it is susceptible to selection bias and
it ignores any differentiation due to experience from different organizations.
On selection bias, imagine a network where everyone is highly likely to get con-
nected. While connections may be necessary for promotion, they have little value
because most connected individuals are not promoted. Looking only at connections
among successful individuals will lead scholars to deduce that connections are use-
ful even if they are not, because the approach misses the fact that all the individuals
not promoted were also connected. One strategy to avoid the pitfalls of selection
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bias is to select individuals based on one level of the government and estimate the
value of connection based on promotion to the next. The dual-level structure allows
scholars to compare the connections of individuals that were successful in getting
to the second level versus those that were not. Our methodology is similar in this
respect: we select individuals based on assignments into the city committee, and
trace forward for promotions in the future.
In addition, grouping connections formed in different organizations into one variable
ignores any differentiation due to experience. Experience from certain cities or
positions could add value to one’s career while the same experience in other cases
could be useless. Because of the add-on value of certain positions, successful
individuals transition to the top through similar career trajectories. These individuals
were automatically connected through co-working ties, but it was their job, not their
connection, that provided them with positive value. Hence, testing the value of
connection while ignoring how it is formed can potentially produce false-positive
findings (see the details of this argument in Fisman et al. (2020)). Our methodology
limits the scope of analysis to one type of connection: that with the party secretary.
By conditioning on one type of connection, we make precise statements about its
value without confounding it with other factors. The approach we developed in this
paper can be applied recursively to higher levels of the hierarchy to pinpoint where
such a connection becomes consequential if ever.
This approach required a new dataset of city committee members that we have
collected. The new data set covers 46 prefecture-level cities from five provinces in
China and spans a period of 20 years. The data allows us to track the assignments of
thousands of individuals into the city committee and their subsequent assignments
after the city committee. We are able to link committee members with the party
secretaries in charge at the time of their assignments into the city committee, and
test how changes in the connected party secretary’s power influence the committee
member’s future. To the best of our knowledge, this data set is the first systematic
documentation of turnover at the city level in China.
The study of connection is important beyond its implication on promotion outcomes.
The informal role connection plays shapes the motivation of the participants and
endows different players with different resources. City leaders with informal ties
to the incumbent provincial leaders deliver significantly faster economic growth
(Jiang, 2017; Wong and Zeng, 2020). External support networks increase the local
politicians’ responsiveness to ordinary citizens by reducing the politicians’ reliance
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on local vested interest (Jiang and Zeng, 2020). Lei (2020) argues that patron-
client relationships boosted infrastructure investment and stimulated the growth of
state-owned enterprises during the financial crisis.
The chapter proceeds as the following. In Section 3.2, we discuss the institutional
background of personnel management system in China and the city party committee
and introduce the literature on connection in China. Section 3.3 describes the data
collection process. In Section 3.4, we develop the hypothesis and our regression
framework. The results and discussions are presented in Section 3.5. Section 3.6
concludes.
3.2 Background and Literature Review
In this section, we outline the personnel management practices in CCP, provide
background information on the functions of the city standing committee, and review
the existing literature on the value of connection in China.
Personnel Management in China
We start by summarizing the formal appointment procedures in the CCP. Regu-
lations on the Work of Selecting and Appointing Leading Party and Government
Cadres2 is the guiding document on cadre management. According to the document,
there are five stages in the appointment process. In the motion stage (Article 11
to 13), the party committee or the organization department collects information on
the opening and drafts documents on how to recruit. In the second, democratic
recommendation, stage (Article 14 to 22), relevant groups hold meetings to rec-
ommend potential candidates for the opening. The Regulations explicitly state that
democratic recommendation is a necessary step for the appointment of any leaders.
In the third, appraisal, stage (Article 23 to 33), the relevant party committee decides
on a list of candidates based on performance and nomination from the democratic
recommendation stage. Then, the local organization department vets the candidates
through investigations and interviews. The next step of the process is discussion
and deliberation (Article 34 to 39). In this stage, the relevant committee and
leaders in the level above the position deliberate and vote on the list of candidates
based on the information gathered in stage three. In the final stage, the candidate is
appointed to the post.
The procedures outlined in the Regulations imply that the party secretary plays a
2We will outline the Regulation published in 2014 since it aligns with our sample period better
than the newest 2019 version. See link for the newest version in Chinese.
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key role in many, if not all, stages of the assignment process of a new committee
member. The party secretary chairs the committee that drafts the opening; he leads
the democratic recommendation meetings; he is interviewed in the appraisal stage;
and he leads the committee that votes on potential candidates. Nevertheless, the
party secretary does not fully control assignments. In fact, even if the party secretary
has the intention to do so, he is constrained by formal procedures and provincial
oversight. Within the limit of formal procedure, the party secretary can influence the
assignments or at least veto individuals of which he does not approve. In addition,
the party secretary has power over the next stages of a committee member’s career.
When an existing committee member is being considered for promotion elsewhere,
as the current leader with direct oversight, the party secretary will be interviewed in
the appraisal stage to give his opinion on the individual’s capabilities.
The party secretary wields considerable influence over the career of the committee
member even operating within the limits of formal procedures. It is important to
note that beyond the rules just outlined, there are informal ways through which
party leaders increase their assignment power in practice. Zeng (2016) argues that
the assignment procedures represent attempts to increase bottom-up participation
within the party, however the process is hindered by loopholes in regulations and
informal practices. For example, party leaders make appointments during recess
periods to override the nomination and the election process. Based on his data
looking at the provincial standing committee, Zeng finds that such override is a
common practice: about 65% of the assignments of provincial standing committee
members happened during recess periods. While we do not have data to evaluate
what percentage of the city committee member assignments were done without
completing the entire assignment process, the informal practices Zeng observed in
higher levels of the government are likely to take place at the city level. These
informal practices would further increase the party secretary’s power in managing
his city committee, providing a strong base for relationships to form between the
city party secretary and the committee members he promoted.
The City Party Standing Committee of Prefecture-Level City
In this subsection, we will provide a short overview of both the prefecture-level city
and the city party standing committee. Prefecture-level city is an administrative
division in the CCP’s bureaucratic hierarchy, ranking below a province and above a
county. Aprefecture-level city is not a “city” in the literal sense, but an administrative
unit consisting of typically one main urban area and its surrounding rural area.
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Currently, there are 293 prefecture-level cities in China.
The party standing committee is de facto the highest local leadership council of the
CCP in any area of jurisdiction. The city party standing committee is the highest
leadership council in the city. The committee typically consists of 9 to 11 members.
Members have primary titles associated with the city committee and secondary titles
indicating their areas of jurisdiction. Primary titles are party secretary, vice party
secretary, and standing member of the committee. Secondary titles include mayor,
deputy vice mayor, head of important departments and committees in the city, and
party secretary of important counties in the city. The composition of secondary titles
is stable across cities and over time. The official term of service for city committees
is five years, although timing of assignment and individual terms of office are quite
variable. Committee meetings are usually held twice a month, but can occur more
often if necessary. Members collectively decide on important issues of the city, from
ideology to economic development, and work closely together under the leadership
of the city party secretary.
Value of Connection
Scholars of Chinese politics have long studied the role connections play in the career
advancements of elite members of the CCP. The literature focuses on the top of the
CCP hierarchy and explores several definitions of connection. One definition creates
a connection among the members of privileged groups. Francois, Trebbi and Xiao
(2016) identified four prominent faction affiliations: the Princelings, the military,
the Youth League Faction, and the Shanghai Gang3. The paper finds substantial
promotion premium for individuals who are in the same faction with the general
party secretary of the CCP.
A second definition creates a connection when two individuals are in the same
work unit at the time. A work unit is any organization or department that the CCP
controls, from governments to ministries to state-owned enterprises. Compared to
the factional ties, this definition broadens the positions where connections can form
from a selective few (Shanghai municipality or the Communist Youth League) to
in theory any positions in any work unit. Shih, Adolph and Liu (2012) find strong
evidence that ties with top leaders played a large role in the political advancement
3The Princelings are descendants of prominent senior CCP officials; the Youth League Faction
is an informal faction that includes officials who originated from the Communist Youth League
(CYL); the Shanghai Gang is a group of officials that rose to prominence in connection to Shanghai
municipal administration under the former general secretary Jiang Zemin.
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of members of the Central Committee. Jia, Kudamatsu and Seim (2015) argue
that connection and performance play complementary roles in promotions. When
connected to central leaders, one standard deviation increase in provincial economic
growth increases the promotion probability of the provincial leader 5.3 percent more
than that of an unconnected provincial leader.
One limitation of both definitions is the inability to separate the quality of the can-
didate from the value of connections. Faction affiliations and co-working ties are
formed endogenously, and the experience itself may change the quality of the candi-
dates. A higher likelihood of promotion could come from either the positive benefits
of connection or simply efficient selection of high-ability individuals into particu-
lar factions or jobs. Fisman et al. (2020) raised the same concern that regressing
connection on promotion without controlling for where the connection was formed
may produce false-positive results. Promising individuals, and especially the high
quality candidates running with small steps through the system, are often assigned
to prestigious postings in certain departments. Because the patrons in higher offices
often rotated through the same set of postings, the similarity in posting patterns will
lead to a false-positive result on the value of connection when in reality the boost
in promotion probability arises from the assignment itself or the differences in the
quality of the candidates.
The issue is further exacerbated by selection bias. The literature starts with a group
of individuals at the top and looks back in time for connections formed in the past.
Prestigious positions that are stepping stones for elites are more likely to show up
in the data, and people who have rotated through such stepping stones are more
likely to score a positive on connection. The structure of the data means that we
cannot know how well connected are the individuals who did not make the cut to
the top circles. If the unobserved individuals are similarly connected, then it would
undermine findings in the literature. The literature’s positive findings could be the
result of a self-fulfilling prophecy where individuals that benefited from having
connections get selected into the data and individuals who did not benefit were
screened out. The positive findings in the literature are a necessary but not sufficient
condition for connection to be beneficial across the board.
Fisman et al. (2020) partly addresses this concern by adding a fixed effect for each
work unit. The paper finds that the connection coefficients are positive before adding
the fixed effects, but inconclusive after. We employ a different strategy to address
this quality and selection issue. In our data, we use one job, membership in the
90
city party standing committee, as the selection criteria, and then trace individual’s
accomplishments after the city committee. We thus do not select individuals based
on whether their next job is a promotion or not. By conditioning on the one job, we
can resolve the differences in job quality without adding hundreds of fixed effects as
controls. We use variations in the city party secretary’s outcome to create variations
in the value of the connections formed in the city committee (it is intuitively better
to be connected to a city party secretary who gets a promotion than to one who
does not). The common initial assignment allows us to focus on the value of the
connection without raising concerns about the value of the assignment.
Another limitation of the literature is its disproportionate focus on the top of the CCP
hierarchy. Most studies find connections with the general secretary, the top leaders,
or members of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), the top leadership body,
to be beneficial. Putting aside the selection issue, the literature is evaluating the
value of connection at the level of the government where connection is most likely
to matter. At the top, the selection criteria are more ambiguous, the cost of faction
building is smaller, and thus leaders have more room to manipulate assignments. At
lower levels, tasks are more likely to be single-dimensional, and thus performance
is measurable and comparable across individuals. Tournaments based on explicit
performance goals can be implemented to incentivize effort (Lazear and Rosen,
1979; Li and Zhou, 2005). The more explicit promotion guideline means that local
leaders would incur a higher reputation cost for supplying connected clients with
promotions. In addition, personnel management at the provincial level is sufficiently
detached from the central government that their practices and the value of inter-
personal connections could be completely different. To the best of our knowledge,
our paper is the first systematic test of the value of connections to provincial leaders
on the city leaders’ career advancement.
Another issue with the definition of connection in this literature is that it is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for identifying an actual relationship. Co-
working experience creates an opportunity for the patron and the client to connect,
but how much and how well the two individuals interact is not observed. Meyer,
Shih and Lee (2016) tested four ways of measuring factional ties as suggested by the
literature. They found that clients connected to patrons under the most restrictive
measure, in which the two individuals work together in the same unit and the junior
member had a rotation or promotion under the supervision of the senior member,
enjoyed the highest boost in promotion likelihood. Keller (2015) similarly found that
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co-working experience sealed with promotion is one of the most precise measures of
patronage relations. In this paper, we infer connections based on active formations
of patron-client pairs. Two individuals are connected when we observe the client
(committee member) is promoted to a position (committee membership) that is
under the direct supervision of the patron (city party secretary). More precisely, a
committee member is connected to the party secretary in place when that member
is appointed to the city committee. In Section 5.1, we will show that the transition
timings of the committee members are highly correlated with the entry and exit of
their connected party secretary, indicating that our definition of connection captures
a meaningful relationship between the patron and the client.
3.3 Data
A New Database for Chinese City-Level Leaders
We overcome the selection bias in the literature by assembling a new data set
consisting of all individuals assigned to the city party standing committee of 46
prefecture-level cities spanning five provinces over a period of 18 years. The data
collection process has three steps. We first obtain assignment information from
the city governments’ official yearbooks. The yearbooks report changes to city
leadership down to the month of the appointment or dismissal. We combined the
eighteen one-year snapshots to obtain the committee turnover data from2000 to 2018
for each city. We were able to accurately document leadership turnovers for 46 out
of the 62 prefecture-level cities in the five provinces. For the 16missing cities, either
the complete history of city yearbooks is not available online or the turnover data
is not consistently documented in the yearbooks. In Section 7.1.1 in the Appendix,
we compared the missing cities with those in our data on observable dimensions.
The in-sample cities are larger in population and higher in per capital GDP, which
motivates our inclusion of city fixed effects in some of our specifications. We do not
expect the missing status to be correlated with personnel practices in the city. The
inability to locate some cities shrinks our sample, but should not bias our findings.
The second step of the data collection process is to obtain individual-level infor-
mation. The city yearbooks contain no additional information on the committee
members other than their assignments. We thus supplemented the turnover data
with career biographies downloaded from various sources4. We successfully lo-
cated biographies for 100% of all the party secretaries and 79.2% of the standing
4Sources include individual biographies on Baidu Baike (link), Local Leader Database on
People.cn (link), Chinese Political Elite Database maintained by Junyan Jiang (link).
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committee members in our data set. We failed to locate the remaining 20.7% per-
cent of the committee members because the biographies of these individuals are
not published digitally in any news articles, most likely because they retired directly
from the city committee. We present documentation of data attrition and discuss
the potential biases introduced by the missing individuals in Section 7.1.2 in the
Appendix. Our regression results are robust to dropping the missing individuals or
including them after making reasonable assumptions about their career outcome.
In the last step of the data collection process, we process and combine the information
from the two data sources. We infer the connection variable from the assignment
data; we parsed out relevant information, such as date of birth, education, gender,
and ethnicity from career biographies to use as controls; and we hand-coded the post
city committee outcome from career biographies. We will discuss the methodology
used in measuring connections and categorizing outcomes in the next sections.
Measuring Connections
Connections between the party secretary and the committee member are the key to
this paper’s agenda. Formally, committee member is connected to party secretary
% if  is assigned to the city committee when P is in charge. The connection
definition does not require the party secretary to be acquainted with the committee
member prior to the assignment. The process of appointment we discussed at the
beginning of the paper makes it likely that the two individuals have some prior
connection. Whether a prior connection exists or not is neither observable nor
of consequence to our argument. Given the party secretary’s level of personal
involvement in the appointment process, assignment into the city committee can
be interpreted as a “favor” granted by the party secretary to the new committee
member. The approval of the city party secretary creates a superior-subordinate tie
and forms a solid foundation for future political cooperation between the two, even
if a tie does not exist before the assignment.
This definition of connection generates a 1 to # mapping from the party secretary to
members of the standing committee. The party secretary works with both committee
members that are connected to him and those that are connected to party secretaries
before him. The average party secretary is connected with 6.2 committee members
(the range is 1 to 16, see Figure 3.4 in the Appendix for distribution). On average,
the committee member works with his connected party secretary for two years in the
city committee before one of them moves to a different position. A quarter of the
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committee members never work with any other party secretary than their connected
one.
Categorizing Transitions
What the city committee members do after they leave the city committee is the
second crucial variable in the analysis. The party secretary and the committee
member can experience one of four mutually exclusive outcomes: promotions,
transitions without promotions, transitions to honorary positions/retirement, and
exits from leadership. In Section 7.2 in Appendix, we list all the possible outcomes
for the party secretary and the committee and our categorization of the outcomes.
Before going into each category, we briefly introduce the CCP’s civil servants rank-
ing system. There are two kinds of ranks: the rank of the department/organization
and the rank of an individual. Each department has a publicized organizational
rank. Unless otherwise specified, the rank of any individual could be inferred based
on the rank of his department and his position within the department5. The rank
of an individual is not explicitly noted unless his rank does not match the rank
of his position. All city party secretaries of prefecture-level cities share the same
bureau-director rank and all standing committee members are at the vice bureau-
director rank (See Figure 3.3 in Appendix for all levels). Promoted party secretaries
join the vice provincial-ministerial rank, which is the rank of the head of any vice
provincial-level organization or the vice head of any provincial-level organization.
Standing committee members who are promoted join the bureau-director rank (the
rank of the party secretaries).
Promotions. Promotion is the most important outcome. We use a conservative
categorization of promotion and place all ambiguous cases into transitions with-
out promotions. For the party secretaries, promotion requires going to the vice
provincial-ministerial rank. Of the 261 party secretaries in our data, 31.4% were
promoted after the party secretary job in which we found them. The most com-
mon jobs after promotion are vice governor in the province, standing member of
the provincial city committee, and mayor or party secretary in vice provincial-level
cities.
For committee members, an upward movement does not necessarily imply an in-
crease in rank. The committee members are at the lower end of the vice bureau-
5The top executive within each organization has the rank of the organization. The rank of
any other individual can be inferred by adding the rank difference between the individual and the
executive to the rank of the organization.
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director rank. On very rare occasions do we observe someone transitioning from
the standing committee directly to a position in the bureau-director rank. Most
committee members move within the vice bureau-director rank one or two times
before they get an actual increase in rank. Without explicit criteria, we rely on
definitions of promotion used in the literature at this level and our understanding
of China’s political hierarchy to hand-code committee members promotions. See
Section 7.2.3 in the Appendix for the criteria and the justification. 26.6% of the
committee members documented were promoted. The most common titles that
signal promotions for committee members are vice party secretary or deputy vice
mayor of prefecture-level cities, vice head or head of provincial departments (de-
pending on the importance and the rank of the department), and standing member
of vice provincial city committees.
Transitions without promotions. We define transitions without promotion as any
change in job title that does not entail promotions as defined above or movements
to honorary positions in the People’s Congress or the Political Consultative Con-
ference. In our data, 30.1% of the party secretaries and 15.3% of the committee
members moved horizontally after their city committee assignments. For the party
secretaries, horizontal movement means staying in the bureau-director rank. Com-
mon destinations include head of provincial departments or ministries, head of
the city party school, and party secretary or chairman of state or province owned
enterprises.
Common destinations for committee members include head or vice head of city
departments or ministries, and heads or vice heads of provincial departments or
ministries. Although not as glorious as promotions, horizontal movements are pos-
itive outcomes for the standing committee members. Frequent transitions are signs
of Party cultivation. Kou and Tsai (2014) characterizes “spring with small steps”
as a mechanism to assist promising cadres who failed to get promotions early on
to escape being trapped in lower-level positions. Frequent rotation will help high-
light the ability of the individuals and enrich their experience and readies them for
promotions. In addition, since there is no rank increase to benchmark promotions,
our categorizations of promotions and horizontal movements are subjective in na-
ture. To make sure that the categorization is not driving our results, in alternative
specifications, we group horizontal movements and promotions together as positive
outcomes and check if the likelihood of positive outcomes changes with connection
ties. Our main results are not sensitive to whether we include horizontal transitions
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in positive outcomes.
Transitions to honorary positions. Transitions to honorary positions include all
movements to the Provincial or City People’s Congress and the Provincial or City
People’s Political Consultative Conference. Positions in these two organizations
are considered as ceremonial by most scholars (Meyer, Shih and Lee, 2016). The
frequency at which individuals transfer out of these ceremonial positions and return
to power is low in the data. Honorary positions are in effect terminal postings before
retirement. Approximately 28.6% of party secretaries and 12.8% of committee
members transfer to honorary positions after the city committee.
Exits. Exits include voluntary withdrawals, direct retirements, and criminal con-
victions. Individuals whose digitized career biographies that we were not able to
locate also fall into this category. For the party secretaries, 2.2%were missing, 1.1%
exited due to corruption investigation, and 1.9% exited directly. For the committee
members, 15.4% were missing, 2.4% exited due to investigation, and 4.0% exited
directly. The four categories do not add up to one because some individuals are still
in office at the end of our observation period, which amount to 4.2% of the party
secretaries and 10.1% of the committee members.
3.4 Hypotheses and Empirical Strategy
Hypotheses
Promotion is a function ofmany factors: the availability of openings, individual abil-
ity and qualifications, and endorsements from coworkers, superiors, and patrons.
The previous literature emphasizes the second and third factors, often debating
whether elite mobility is explained by the performance model or the connection
model. Our data do not include job openings for most mid-level positions; we
partially observe ability, proxied by the combination of age, education, and job per-
formance; we only observe specific types of connections made, such as co-working
and hometown ties. In this paper, we test whether specific kinds of connection
ties—connection with the current party secretary and connection with a promoted
party secretary—are valuable for committee members while partially controlling for
individual ability.
Specifically, committee members are treated with two different party secretary
outcomes depending on who leaves the committee first. The first treatment occurs
when the connected party secretary exits the city committee. The committeemember
transitions fromworking under his connected party secretary to working under a new
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commanding officer. If the party secretary’s influence over the committee member’s
next assignment is constrained bywhether he is still in office, the treatment will lower
the committeemember’s promotion likelihood. The second treatment happens when
the connected party secretary is promoted. In the case of promotion, the committee
member is treated with having a close connection with someone in higher office. If
gaining power increases the party secretary’s influence over his connections’ next
assignments, we would expect the promotion likelihood of the connected committee
member to increase.
There are four possible ways for the two treatments to impact the committee mem-
ber’s promotion likelihood. In case 1, the party secretary exercises more influence
over the connected committee members’ next assignments both when he is in office
and after he has been promoted. There is no institutional or reputational constraint
on the party secretary on recommending his clients, and connections are valuable
as long as the party secretary stays in power. In case 2, the party secretary has
influence while he is in the committee. Connections with the party secretary are
valuable but limited in scope. From the party secretary’s point of view, recom-
mending a current connected subordinate for promotion is a common practice, but
once out of the committee, going out of one’s way to help a past subordinate is risky
behavior. From the committee member’s perspective, promotions need to happen
before the connected party secretary leaves, otherwise, the member is much less
likely to get promoted later on. In case 3, the party secretary does not exercise
much influence over the connected members’ promotion while he is in office, but he
helps out old subordinates once he himself gets promoted. Connection is valuable
but the party secretary’s influence is limited without a promotion. Gaining higher
status is essential in helping the connected subordinates. In this case, we expect
to see the committee members’ promotion destinations to be highly correlated with
where the party secretary was promoted. In case 4, the member’s promotion does
not depend on the secretary’s ability or promotion. The value of connection at this
level is marginal and dominated by other factors such as opening availabilities and
individual ability. Either the party secretaries are not influential, or faction building
is of no value to them.
In an ideal situation, wewould first compare the promotion likelihood of a committee
member when his connected party secretary is on the city committee with when
his connected party secretary has left. Given that the connected party secretary
has left the committee, we would then check if the committee member’s promotion
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likelihood changes with whether the connected party secretary gets a promotion.
Obviously, we only observe one particular outcome for each pair. The best we can do
is to hold the individual and assignment level characteristics constant and compare
how the party secretary’s outcomes impact the committee member’s promotion
likelihood.
Important individual-level characteristics to take into account include age, education,
gender, ethnicity, and shared hometown tie. All these variables except age are
straightforward to control for because they are fixed in time. Controlling for age
is potentially complicated but essential for our analyses. It is complicated because
age interacts with tenure through talent, experience, and mandatory retirement age.
If one enters a job at a younger age, one can afford to accumulate more experience
while staying eligible for promotion. However, if one enters the job at an older
age, one’s promotion window closes much sooner. The mechanism implies that
the baseline promotion likelihood as a function of tenure for people in different age
groups could be non-proportional, which would violate a key assumption of our
hazard model. At the same time, properly controlling for age is essential for our
identification. All other things equal, being younger than one’s coworkers signals
ability because the individual rotated through lower-level positions much faster.
These individuals “sprint with small steps” through the system and are perceived to
be either individuals with high ability or individuals with solid ties to the central
government (Kou and Tsai, 2014). Self-fulfilling prophecy or not, the individuals
“sprinting with small steps” have a high likelihood of promotion from the current
level onward. The marginal impact of connection on promotion likelihood could
differ based on whether the individual is “sprinting with small steps” or not. In the
baseline regression, we add age as a control variable. To rule out the possibility of
misspecification due to age’s complicated impact on one’s career, we run the model
on different age cohorts separately and present the result in the robustness section.
Regression Framework
We use a discrete time competing risk model for the regression analysis. We defined
three states of interest: promotion (P), transition (T), and exit (E). For each interval
C, we define a categorical response H8C :
H8C =

0 if no event in C;
A if event of type A in C (A = P,T,E).
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We define the probability of promotion during interval C as ?A
8C
= %A (H8C = A |H8,C−1 =








= UAC8 + VA-8C + D
As stated in Section 4.1, we use two forms of UC8 to model the impact of tenure:
a step function of C and a quadratic function of C. The variables of interest, -8C ,
come in two sets: time-variant connection variables and time-invariant controls.
The first connection variable denotes whether the party secretary is still in the city
committee or not (Treatment 1). The variable is 0 at the beginning and turns 1 when
the party secretary exits. The second connection variable denotes whether the party
secretary gets a promotion or not (Treatment 2). This variable also starts at 0 and
turns 1 once the party secretary exits the city committee with a promotion. Time
invariant controls include age of the committee member at assignment, education
level, ethnicity, gender, city fixed effects, and year fixed effects. We report the
statistical results that show the chance for promotion compared with the status quo.
We present the full set of V% under different definitions of promotion and varying
inclusion of controls. In robustness, we (1) estimate V using selective subsets of the
data, and (2) estimate V% with a binary response model treating all other types of
events as censored.
3.5 Results
Assignment Patterns in City Committees
One prerequisite of our main analysis is that the connection variable captures mean-
ingful relationships between the party secretary and the standing committee mem-
bers. As we have described in Section 3.2.1, the party secretary has a formal role
in the assignment of new committee members and the transition of existing ones.
Empirically, we observe that the entry of a party secretary brings a high influx of
newmembers. Symmetrically, a secretary’s exit leads to rapid cleansing of the com-
mittee so that there is not much variation in committee size over time. As outsiders
to the system, we cannot tell who exactly is pulling the promotion levers, but the
evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the party secretary has a high level
of control over the appointment to the city committee. In this section, we will argue
that the observed patterns are not solely the result of political cycles, the design
of the city committees, or provincial interventions. After ruling out the obvious
alternative explanations, we argue that the synchronized movements suggest that
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the party secretary plays an active role in forming and managing ties with standing
committee members.
The entry of a new party secretary produces immediate turnover in the city commit-
tee. We observe an influx of new committee members and rapid exits of members
connected with the previous party secretary. Out of all standing committee assign-
ments, 45.8% take place within the first year of the arrival of a new party secretary,
and 65.0% within the first two years. If assignments of committee members were
to occur evenly over time, only 28.4% of the assignments should take place within
the first year based on an average tenure of 3.7 years. In terms of the number of
assignments, we observe 3.7 assignments within the first year of the party secretary’s
entry, and that number decreases to 2 per year for the rest of the party secretary’s
term (see Figure 3.6 in Appendix).
To make space for assignments of new committee members, existing members of
the city committee quickly exit the committee when a new party secretary comes
in. Figure 3.8 in Appendix plots the exit timing of the standing committee members
relative to the turnover of the party secretary. We observe higher than usual turnover
right after the exit (assignment) of the current (new) party secretary. 30% of all
the committee members’ exits take place within one year of the appointment of a
new party secretary. The spike in the exit rate is driven by the exit of people who
are connected with the party secretary leaving office. In Figure 3.9, we plot the
transition probability of committee members connected with party secretary whose
tenure equals 2, 3, 4, and 5 years. Regardless of the length of the party secretary’s
tenure, we observe the highest turnover rate after the connected leader leaves office.
The correlation in entry and exit timing alone is not proof that the party secretary is
actively recruiting and managing committee members. The correlation could arise
mechanically out of a personnel management system with periodic top to bottom
turnover. In theory, each city committee has a standard term of five years, and if a
higher than usual number of replacements took place at the end of the term, wewould
expect the assignment timing of the party secretary and the committee members to
align. To rule this out as the main contributing factor, we run a regression of the
number of appointments on whether a party secretary was recently assigned to the
city while controlling for potential political cycles. The baseline regression model
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is:
Number of New Appointments2,C =
V0 + V1NPS2,C+V2NPS2,C−1 + V3NPS2,C−2 + X2 + n2,C (3.1)
where NPS2,: denotes whether city 2 got a new party secretary at year : . We include
city fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity in the city that resulted in
different assignment rates. On top of the baseline model, we include years relative
to the national congress to control for the reshuffling of politicians due to national
events; in an alternative specification, we add year fixed effects to control for any
macro-level events that may impact assignments. If the committee appointment
cycles drive everything, V1 should be zero after the inclusion of different controls.
On the other hand, if there is coordination in entries, V1 should remain positive.
Results are reported in column (1) to (3) in Table 3.4 in the Appendix. The influx
of committee members post party secretary entry remains high after controlling for
national trends.
The correlation we observe could still be a feature of the institutional design of
the city committee if city committees start the five-year term in different years. If
the turnover year is different for each city, then a global control for political cycles
will not capture the turnover cycle in each city. Empirically, however, the turnover
of party secretaries rarely aligns with the five-year schedule: only 28.2% of party
secretaries were in office for the length of the standard term plus or minus one year
(for full distribution see Figure 3.5 in Appendix).
To completely rule out this possibility, we run two alternative specifications to the
regression in (1). In the first one, we include a separate set of national congress
controls for each city, allowing each city to have a different five-year cycle; in the
second specification, we exclude assignments that are most likely to be the result
of committee reshuffling. We do so by excluding assignments by party secretaries
whose predecessor stayed for the full term6. We present the results in columns (4)
and (5) in Table 3.4. V1 remains significant after controlling for individual city cycles
and the out-of-sync assignments. Further analysis shows that the arrival rate of new
committee members is independent of the normality or abnormality of the previous
party secretary’s term. In Figure 3.7, we plot the number of first-year assignments
6The reasoning here is that if the previous party secretary was in sync with the committee’s
five-year cycle, then assignments by the current party secretary are more likely due to systematic
reshuffling.
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of the new party secretary against the tenure of the previous party secretary and we
observe no correlation between the two measures.
The turnover patterns we present suggest that the entries and exits of committee
members are highly dependent on the entry and exit of the connected party secretary.
The correlation is significant even after controlling for alternative reasons such as
turnover cycles. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the party
secretary is actively involved in the careers of his connected members, providing
validation for the measure of connection we use for the next part of the paper.
Non-parametric Analysis of Promotion Likelihood
Before diving into regression analysis, we start with the non-parametric estimation
of the committee members’ promotion prospects under different treatments. Table
3.1 has three parts: in (A), we document the sample size for each treatment group
and year in office; in (B), we calculate promotion likelihoods under each treatment
and year; and in (C), we repeat the analysis using a broader definition of committee
member promotion. In the notes under Table 3.1, we walk through the numbers for
an example case of C = 3. The non-parametric analysis is a first pass at evaluating
the value of connection. We break down the data by tenure and treatments only
and do not control for any other supply or demand-side factors that would impact
promotion likelihood.
The first two rows of Table 3.1(A) document the number of committee members in
the city committee at the beginning of year C. The values in the two rows decrease
over time as more committee members exit the city committee each year. As C
increases, more committee members transition from having their connected party
secretaries in the city committee to having them out of the city committee. The
high correlation between the committee member’s tenure and getting treatment 1
is why controlling for tenure is essential for our estimation. In the next few rows
of (A), we further break down the committee members whose party sectaries have
exited the city committee by the outcome of the party secretaries (Treatment 2). The
percentage of committee members whose connected party secretaries are promoted
varies year by year with no noticeable pattern.
After counting the number of data points in each treatment, we present the empirical
average promotion likelihood for each group in Table 3.1(B).We first break down the
likelihood bywhether the connected party secretary is still in office or not (Treatment
1). The variance of promotion rate overtime is low, and promotion is possible at
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Table 3.1: Nonparametric estimation of promotion likelihood
Year t
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8+
(A) Number of committee members in the city committee given
Party secretary in 1002 551 314 138 58 18 5 1
Party secretary out 244 387 409 373 292 215 158 201
-PS promoted 48 94 61 79 53 32 19 57
-PS not promoted 196 293 348 294 239 183 139 144
-% promoted 19.7% 24.3% 14.9% 21.2% 18.2% 14.9% 12.0% 28.4%
(B) Likelihood of promotion for committee members in year t given
Party secretary in 6.6% 8.3% 9.2% 9.4% 5.2%
-PS promoted* 2.5% 5.7% 9.1% 10.9% 10.5%
Party secretary out 7.0% 4.9% 8.6% 7.0% 12.7% 6.5% 10.8% 9.9%
-PS promoted 9.3% 4.4% 10.8% 5.7% 14.4% 5.5% 14.0% 8.4%
(C) Likelihood of non-retirement movement for committee members in year t given
Party secretary in 11.2% 12.7% 15.0% 13.0% 10.3%
-PS promoted* 4.5% 9.4% 12.8% 13.0% 15.8%
Party secretary out 11.1% 8.3% 13.0% 12.3% 17.1% 13.0% 13.3% 15.8%
-PS promoted 14.4% 8.0% 16.2% 10.6% 16.5% 11.0% 14.0% 11.8%
Notes: Let us take C = 3 as an example. Documented in (A) is the breakdown
of the number of data points we have in each treatment group at year 3. At the
beginning of year three, 723 committee members are in the city committee, 315 of
whom are working with their connected party secretaries and 409 are working with
new party secretaries. Out of the 409 committee members with new party secretaries,
61 (14.9%) saw their previous and connected party secretaries leave with a promotion
and 348 (85.1%) saw their previous and connected party secretaries leave without
one. Documented in (B) is the promotion likelihood at year 3 given each type of
treatment. For the 314 committee members whose connected party secretary is in the
city committee, 9.2% are promoted out of the committee member job by the end of
year 3; and for the 409 committee members working with new party secretaries, 8.6%
are promoted. If we further condition on the party secretary’s outcome, for the 61
committee members whose party secretaries have exited with a promotion, 10.8% of
them are promoted in year 3. The stared (*) PS promoted category is calculated using
the party secretaries’ outcomes in the future of the committee member’s promotion.
For the committee members whose party secretaries are still in office but would be
promoted later on, the probability of promotion is 9.1%. In (C), we document
the same likelihood as in (B) but with a broader definition of promotion. In (B)
and (C), promotion likelihood under party secretary in for C ≥ 6 is dropped from the
table due to small number of data points.
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any point of the committee member’s tenure for both groups. This suggests that the
committeemember’s promotion is not determined by one particular mechanism. For
example, if only the committee members sprinting with small steps get promoted,
we would observe a high likelihood in the beginning and a lower likelihood as C
increases. If only experience matters, then the probability would rise after year 3
or 4. Alternatively, if connection with the current party secretaries is essential for
promotion, then the likelihood under party secretary in-committee should be much
larger than that under party secretary out-of-committee. The fact that there is no
noticeable pattern over time or between the two groups indicates that a combination
of factors contributes to the committee member’s promotion likelihood. We observe
similar patterns in (C) after broadening the definition of promotion.
To estimate the impact of Treatment 2, we calculate the promotion likelihood of
only committee members whose party secretaries were promoted after leaving. If
connection with promoted party secretaries is valuable, then promotion likelihood
under party secretary promoted should be higher than under party secretary out.
We observe no clear difference in promotion likelihood for one group over the other
in either (B) or (C). Having a connected patron in power does not consistently lead
to better committee member outcomes. Based on the non-parametric analysis, we
cannot reject the hypothesis that connections matter, but it seems that connection
with the party secretary is not the dominant factor in the committee members’
promotion at this stage. Since population characteristics change over time and the
non-parametric analysis does not account for these changes, we proceed to regression
analysis in the next section.
Regression Analysis
Table 3.2 summarizes the results of the multinomial logit analysis. We present
the set of V% here and estimations of V) and V can be found in Section 3.7 in
Appendix. As stated in Section 3.4, we use two functional forms to model tenure:
a step function of C in (1) to (3) and a quadratic function of C in (4) to (6). We start
with the most basic regression of the two treatments and the age of the committee
member in (1) and (4). Since other individual characteristics may lead to different
baseline promotion rates, we add additional individuals level controls in (2) and (5).
The timing and location of the committee member assignments could also have an
impact on the baseline promotion rate, hence, we add assignment level controls in
(3) and (6). As we can see in Table 3.2, most coefficients are stable across the six
regression setups.
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Table 3.2: Multinomial logit analysis on chance for promotion on committeemembers
Dependent variable:
Committee member promotion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PS out 0.060 0.009 -0.155 -0.137 -0.188 -
0.453**
(0.153) (0.155) (0.171) (0.156) (0.159) (0.177)
PS promotion 0.225 0.276* 0.175 0.223 0.276* 0.172
(0.165) (0.167) (0.193) (0.165) (0.167) (0.194)










(0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015)
Education - bachelors 0.053 0.090 0.068 0.095
(0.228) (0.246) (0.228) (0.247)
Education - masters 0.240* 0.302** 0.242* 0.310**
(0.138) (0.146) (0.139) (0.147)
Female -0.343* -0.358* -0.332* -0.342
(0.202) (0.208) (0.202) (0.209)
Han -0.163 -0.031 -0.172 -0.009
(0.538) (0.559) (0.540) (0.563)
InSync -0.137 -0.212*
(0.127) (0.129)
Step function Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic function Yes Yes Yes
City FE Yes Yes
Number of observations 4698 4624 4624 4698 4624 4624
Notes: Only V% is presented here.
Losing the connected party secretary harms committee member’s promotion like-
lihood, although the coefficients are not all negative and are only significant in the
last specification. Post exit, promotion of the connected party secretary increases
the promotion likelihood of the committee members across specifications but only
estimates in columns (2) and (5) are statistically significant. The coefficients support
the hypothesis that the party secretary has more influence when he is still in office
and when he gets a promotion, although that impact is not well identified based on
the current data.
To get a better idea of the quantitative impact of various factors, we calculate the
odds ratio using coefficients from (6). The exit of the connected party secretary leads
to a change of odds of promotion by a factor of 0.63, which means that individuals
without a connected party secretary in office are 37% less likely to be promoted in
each period after the connected party secretary’s exit. The promotion of the party
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secretary post-exit increases the odds ratio by a factor of 1.19, which means that
connection with a successful party secretary increases the probability of promotion
by 19% in each period. The value of connection with a successful party secretary
is positive but not enough to offset the negative impact of the party secretary’s exit
from the city committee. Other statistically significant coefficients include start age,
master’s degree, and InSync. Each one-year increase in start age decreases the odds
by 0.94, having a master’s degree increases the odds by 1.27, and arriving in sync
with the party secretary decreases the odds by 0.80.
Since our coefficients are not well identified, we stratify the data to check if the
value of connection is more significant for specific subsets of individuals. We run
the regression in Table 3.2 column (3) and only present the key variables. First, we
stratify the data by the start age of the committee members. The underlying idea is
that younger individuals sprinting with small steps through the system might benefit
differently from the connection as compared to individuals closer to the retirement
age. The coefficients are documented in (1) to (3) of Table 3.6(A) in Appendix. The
exit of the connected party secretary has a similar negative effect on the promotion
likelihood of the younger and the older cohort, but the party secretary’s promotion
has a positive benefit only on the younger cohort. However, in all specifications, no
coefficients are statistically significant at conventional levels.
Second, to ensure no one province is steering the coefficients in a specific direction
because of some province-specific promotion practices, we run the same regression
on subsets of the data dropping each province at a time. Results are presented in (5)
to (8) of Table 3.6(B). The coefficient estimates of PS out are consistently negative,
while the estimates of PS promotion are unstable. Provincial norms matters for
whether connections to successful party secretaries are valuable or not.
Third, to rule out any bias created by the codification of promotion, we run the same
regression using more inclusive definitions of positive outcomes. The results are
reported in (9) to (12) of Table 3.6(C). Broadening the definition of promotion for the
committee members has no impact on our estimates, confirming our intuition that
promotion and horizontal transitions are both positive outcomes for the committee
members. Committee members are more likely to move up or horizontally if their
connection stayed in the committee or got promoted. Broadening the definition of
promotion for the party secretaries flips the coefficients. We expect the coefficients to
be different since there is a qualitative difference between promotion and horizontal
movement for the party secretaries. A party secretary who received an increase
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in rank wields considerably more influence than a party secretary who moved
horizontally. The comparison suggests that only the party secretaries who moved to
consequential positions were able to help their former subordinates. However, the
interpretations here are tentative since no coefficients are significant at conventional
levels. These findings are consistent with the prior observation that performance
play a larger role in the career advancement of lower-level officials.
We repeated the main analysis using a multivariate logit model, treating all other
outcomes as censored. The estimates, shown in Table 3.5, are similar to our current
results. Putting the different pieces together, we find some evidence that ties with
the current party secretary and with promoted party secretaries are valuable, but the
estimates are not significant at conventional levels for most configurations or subsets
of the data. Young age, education, and being male is beneficial for promotion as we
would expect. These factors are well-identified in most configurations.
3.6 Conclusion
To summarize, analysis on assignment timing suggests that our measure of con-
nection captures real relationships between the party secretary and the committee
members. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the party secretaries
are actively involved in the appointments of members of the committees they run.
Despite having a close relationship, in the non-parametric analysis, we find that
an active connection with the current party secretary or the increase of power of
a connected party secretary does not increase the committee member’s promotion
likelihood. After controlling for other determinants of promotion in the regression
analysis, we find that the outcomes of the committee member is slightly better when
his connection is still in office or if he leaves with a promotion. Both effects are
small and not well identified.
Based on previous findings in the literature, we expected connection to be con-
sequential in the Chinese bureaucracy. The positive benefit of connection is well
identified in many articles, even with connection variables loosely defined as shared
work experience, hometown, or education ties. The differences between our findings
and results in the literature highlight that the value of connection is not homoge-
neous across the system. Some connections, which the literature is more likely to
select by focusing on top of the hierarchy, prove to be beneficial. However, China
is too large to be run solely by individuals connected to the party secretary general
or members of the Politburo. The majority of the local bureaucrats never made it to
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the radar of core party leaders, but the connections they have made with their local
leaders could still be beneficial, which is what this paper tests for.
Our results do not negate the existing understanding that connections are conse-
quential at the top. There are many potential reasons why the city party secretary
connection is less valuable immediately after the city committee assignment: rep-
utation cost of faction building could be higher, the benefit of having connected
clients could be lower, stricter institutional constrain placed on the party secretaries
because they are often promoted to vice-leadership positions of an organization, and
so on. The natural follow-up question to our research is: do the connections formed
in the city committee resurface in subsequent stages of someone’s career? If so,
at what level? Based on previous literature and news articles on China, we know
that individuals benefit from network ties formed early on with someone who later
becomes a core party leader7. Subsequent scholars could use our methodology to
trace forward in time to study if connections formed in the city committee become
beneficial in the later stages of one’s career. Tracing one type of connection through
time would allow scholars to make precise statements on when ties formed in the
cities start to matter in the Chinese hierarchy.
Our study adds to the current understanding of Chinese bureaucracy in the literature
by showing that the value of connection is not standardized across individuals and
different levels of the system. As Doyon and Keller (2020) suggest, the value of
connection, even within a large group of similarly ranked people, is sensitive to
exactly to whom one is connected. In future works, we want to evaluate other types
of connections formed at the city level to completely rule out the possibility that
connections we did not account for in this paper matter. We also want to apply our
methodology to higher levels of the bureaucracy, such as the provincial committee.
If we find that the exact type of connection ties are more valuable in the provincial
committee, we would be able to strengthen our statement that the difference in level
drives differences in results.
7There are numerous articles on how the current party secretary general promotes his former





We are able to document the turnover data of 46 out of the 62 prefecture-level cities
from Guangdong, Zhejiang, Fujian, Jiangsu, and Shandong province. In Figure 3.1,
we compare the population and the per person GDP of the in sample cities with that
of the missing cities. The in-sample cities are larger in population and higher in per
capital GDP. The differences in city size motivates our inclusion of city fixed effects
in some of our specifications. While it is more likely that committee members from
affluent cities have a high likelihood of promotion, our connection variable would
not be biased as long as the value of connection with a successful party secretary is
not correlated with the size of the city.
Figure 3.1: Characteristics of in-sample vs. missing cities
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Missing Individuals
Data attrition occurs at different stages of the data collection process:
• We start with the full sample of individuals listed in the city yearbooks (S1).
• We remove ineligible individuals, including military personnel (E1) and left
and right truncation individuals (E2) to arrive at the sample of eligible indi-
viduals (S2). We remove military personnel because their career trajectories
are different from civil servants. Right truncation refers to individuals who
are still in the city committee by the end of our sample period. We do not
know the outcome of right-truncated individuals. Left truncation refers to in-
dividuals who were already assigned to the city committee when our sample
period begins. We do not know who assigned the left-truncated individuals
into the city committee and when that happened.
Figure 3.2: Left and right truncation by year
• We remove individuals with key information missing (date of birth (E3) and
outcome (E4)) and arrive at our final sample (S3).








(S1) (E1) (E2) (S2) (E3) (E4) (S3) (S2/S3)
Zhejiang 185 5 155 150 3 21 128 85.3%
Fujian 127 3 95 92 3 16 76 82.6%
Guangdong 366 14 278 264 8 58 198 66.7%
Jiangsu 485 53 347 294 55 60 215 73.1%
Shandong 423 40 337 297 44 73 221 83.7%
Total 1586 115 1212 1097 113 228 838 76.4%
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The only problematic attrition of the data is the removal of individuals with key
information missing. The percentage of individuals with incomplete information
ranges from 15% in Zhejiang to 34% in Guangdong, the average being 24%. To
get an idea of why individuals were missing, we randomly chose a city and tracked
down all missing individual through news reports and party documents. We were
able to find most of the missing individuals and infer their outcomes from secondary
sources. The majority of these individuals either directly transferred to the People’s
Congress or the Political Consultative Conference in the city (retirement positions),
or exited right away after the city committee. In robustness regressions, wemake the
assumption that all missing individuals retire directly after the city committee and
infer their date of birth based on the retirement time. The inclusion of the missing
individuals does not change our regression results.
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Categorizing Outcomes
Categorizing Party Secretary Outcomes
See PDF attached on the next page.
地区级别 单位 具体职务 Location Organization Job Title Outcome Count
Center





Liaison Office of the Central 
Government in the Macao 
Special Administrative Region
Vice Director horizontal 1
Province
省 省委 常委 Province Provincial Committee Standing Member promotion 23
省 省委 副书记 Province Provincial Committee Vice Party Secretary promotion 2
省 省委 秘书长/副秘书长 Province Provincial Committee Secretary General/Vice Secretary General horizontal 3
省 省政府 副省长 Province Government Vice Governor promotion 40
省 省政府 秘书长 Province Government Secretary General horizontal 5
省 省政府 省长助理 Province Government Assistant to the Governor horizontal 4
省 省政府 党组成员 Province Government Committee Member horizontal 1
省 省政府 参事 Province Government Counselor horizontal 1
省 组织部 常务副部长/副部长 Province Organization Department Vice Minister horizontal 2
省 统战部 部长/副部长 Province United Front Work Department Minister/Vice Minister horizontal 3
省 省委党校 校长 Province Party School Director horizontal 1
省 发展和改革委员会 党组书记 Province Commission of Development and Reform Party Secretary horizontal 3





Commission of Urban and Rural 
Construction and Environmental 
Resources Protection
Vice Director horizontal 1
省 审计厅 厅长 Province Department of Audit Director horizontal 1
省 民政厅 厅长 Province Department of Civil Affairs Director horizontal 1
省 农业厅 厅长 Province Department of agriculture Director horizontal 1
省 司法厅 党委书记/厅长 Province Department of Justice Party Secretary/Director horizontal 1
省 公安厅 厅长 Province Department of Public Security Director horizontal 2
省 国土资源厅 党组书记/厅长 Province Department of Land and Resources Party Secretary/Director horizontal 2
省 劳动和社会保障厅 厅长 Province Department of labor and social security Director horizontal 1
省 住房和城乡建设厅 厅长 Province Department of housing and urban-rural development Director horizontal 1
省 食品药品监督管理局 局长 Province Food and Drug Administration Director horizontal 1
省 工商行政管理局 党组书记/局长 Province Department of Business Administration Director horizontal 1
省 供销合作社 主任/副主任 Province Supply and Marketing Cooperative Director/Vice Director horizontal 1
省 社会科学院 党委书记 Province Academy of Social Sciences Party Secretary horizontal 1
省 人大常委会 主任/副主任/党组书记 Province Standing Committee of People's Congress
Director/Vice 
Director/Party Secretary retirement 21




副省级市 市委 书记 VPL City City Committee Party Secretary promotion 2
副省级市 市委 市委副书记 VPL City City Committee Vice Party Secretary horizontal 8
副省级市 政府 市长 VPL City Government Mayor promotioin 9
副省级市 政协常委会 主席/副主席 VPL City Standing Committee of People's Consultative Conference Chairman/Vice Chairman retirement 3
Prefectural Level City
地级市 市委 市委书记 City City Committee Party Secretary horizontal 10
地级市 市委 市委副书记 City City Committee Vice Party Secretary horizontal 2
地级市 军区 第一书记 City Military Party Secretary horizontal 5
地级市 市委党校 校长 City Party School Director horizontal 9
地级市 人大常委会 主任/副主任/党组书记 City Standing Committee of People's Congress
Director/Vice 
Director/Party Secretary retirement 35
地级市 经济技术开发区管委会 主任 City Committee of Economic and Technological Development Zone Director promotion 1
Other




Asian Development Bank Chief Expert horizontal 1
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Categorizing Committee Member Outcomes
See PDF attached on the next page.
地区级
别
单位 具体职务 Location Organization Job Title Outcome Count
Center
中央 外交部 国外工作局局长 Center Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director of X Bureau promotion 1
中央 组织部 党建研究所所长 Center Organization Department
Head of Party Building 
Research Institute promotion 1
中央 组织部 x局副局长 Center Organization Department Vice Director of X Bureau promotion 3
中央 财经领导小组办公室 经济x组副组长 Center Office of Financial Leadership Vice Leader of Group X promotion 1
中央 发改委 办公厅副主任 Center Development and Reform Commission
Vice Director of General 
Office promotion 1
中央 国务院法制办公室 秘书行政司司长 Center
Legislative Affairs 
Office of State 
Council 





直辖市 区委 副书记 Municipality District Committee Vice Party Secreatry promotion 1
直辖市 县委书记 书记 Municipality District Committee Party Secreatry horizontal 1






  Party Commitee
省 省委 副秘书长 Province Provincial Committee Vice Secretary General promotion 3










Province Commission for Discipline Inspection
Leader of Inspection Team 
Dispatched to Cities horizontal 6
省 省纪委 委员 Province Commission for Discipline Inspection Committee Member horizontal 1
省 省委组织部 副部长 Province Organization Department Vice Minister promotion 5
省 省委宣传部 副部长 Province Propaganda Department Vice Minister promotion 4
省 省委政法委 副书记 Province
Commission for 
Political and Legal 
Affairs
Vice Party Secretary promotion 2




Team Leader horizontal 12





省 省委改革办（发改委） 常务副主任 Province Reform Committee Deputy Vice Director promotion 1
省 省委党史工办 主任/副主任 Province Office of Party History Director retirement 3
省 省委台湾工办 副主任 Province Office of Taiwan Affairs Vice Director retirement 1
Province
Government, Organizations and Commissions
省 政府 办公厅副主任 Province Government Vice Office Director promotion 3
省 政府 副秘书长 Province Government Vice Secretary General promotion 6
省 共青团 书记 Province Youth League Party Secretary promotion 4
省 共青团 副书记 Province Youth League Vice Party Secretary horizontal 1
省 妇联 主席/党组书记 Province Women's Federation Director/Party Secretary promotion 2
省 妇联 副主席 Province Women's Federation Vice Director horizontal 2
省 作协 党组书记 Province Wriers Association Party Secretary horizontal 1
省 侨联 党组书记 Province Federation of Oversea Chinese Party Secretary promotion 1
省 省总工会 副主席 Province Worker's Union Vice Chairman horizontal/retirement 1
省 省经济贸易委员会 党组成员 Province Economic and Trade Commission Comittee Member horizontal 1
省 省发展和改革委员会 副主任 Province Development and Reform Commission Vice Director promotion 3
地区级
别




























Marine Port and 
Development 
Commission
Vice Director horizontal 1
省 省检查委员会 委员 Province Inspection Commission Committee Member horizontal 1
Province




Province Department of Public Security













省民政厅 副厅长 Province Department of Civil Affairs Vice Director horizontal 2
省 省建设厅 党组书记 Province Department of Construction Party Secretary promotion 1
省 省教育厅 副厅长 Province Department of Education Vice Director horizontal 2
省 省监察厅 副厅长 Province Department of Supervision Vice Director horizontal 3
省 省水利厅 厅长 Province Department of Water Resources Director promotion 1
省 省水利厅 党组副书记 Province Department of Water Resources Vice Party Secretary horizontal 1
省 省商务厅 厅长/党组书记 Province Department of Commerce Director/Party Secretary promotion 2
省 省商务厅 副厅长 Province Department of Commerce Vice Director horizontal 2
省 省交通厅 党组副书记 Province Department of Transportation Vice Party Secretary promotion 3
省 省文化厅 党组成员 Province Department of Culture Committee Member horizontal 2
省 省林业厅 副厅长 Province Department of Forestry Vice Director horizontal 2
省 省审计厅 副厅长 Province Department of Audit Vice Director horizontal 5
省 省司法厅 副厅长 Province Department of Law and Justice Vice Director horizontal 3









Vice Director horizontal 1




Vice Party Secretary horizontal 1




Vice Director promotion 1
省 省国家安全厅 厅长 Province Department of Homeland Security Director promotion 1
省 省国土资源厅 副厅长 Province Department of Land and Resources Vice Director horizontal 1
省 省国土资源厅 巡视员 Province Department of Land and Resources Inspector retirement 1








Vice Director horizontal 5
地区级
别
单位 具体职务 Location Organization Job Title Outcome Count
省 省档案局 局长 Province Bureau of Archives Director horizontal 1
省 省信访局 副局长 Province Bureau of Letters and Calls Vice Director horizontal 2
省 省民防局 副局长 Province Bureau of Civil Defense Vice Director horizontal 1
省 省旅游局 党组书记/局长 Province Department of Travel Director/Party Secretary horizontal 4
省 省统计局 局长 Province Bureau of Statistics Director horizontal 1
省 省地税局 副局长 Province Bureau of Land Tax Vice Director horizontal 1
省 省地质局 副局长 Province Bureau of Land Geology Vice Director horizontal 2
省 老干部局 副局长 Province Bureau of Retired Cadres Vice Director horizontal 1
省 省公务员局 局长 Province Bureau of Cadre Management Director horizontal 1
省 省新闻出版局 副局长 Province Bureau of News and Publication Vice Director horizontal 3





省 省广播电视局 副局长 Province Bureau of Broadcast and Television Vice Director horizontal 2
省 省监狱管理局 党委书记 Province Bureau of Prison Management Party Secretary horizontal 1
省 省海洋与渔业局 副局长 Province Bureau of Oceans and Fisheries Vice Director horizontal 1
省 省工商行政管理局 副局长 Province Bureau of Industry and Commerce Vice Director horizontal 3








局长 Province Bureau of Work Safety Director promotion 3
省 省质量技术监督局 副局长 Province
Bureau of Quality 
and Technical 
Supervision










National Grain and 
Material Reserve 
Bureau x Branch






副主任 Province Office of X Vice Director horizontal 8
Province
Others




Committee Member retirement 2
省 省政协 副秘书长 Province Political Consultative Conference Vice Secretary General retirement 1
省 省政协 港澳台委员会副主任 Province Political Consultative Conference
Vice Director of Hongkong, 
Taiwan, and Macau Affairs retirement 1
省 省高级人民法院 党组成员 Province The Supreme People's Court Committee Member promotion 1
省 省贸促会 副会长 Province Trade Promotion Commission Vice Chairman horizontal 1
省 省直属机关工委 副书记 Province 
Work Committee for 
Offices Directly 
under the Province







Party Secretary retirement 1
省 省政府驻北京办事处 主任 Province Provincial Office in Beijing Director promotion 1
地区级
别
单位 具体职务 Location Organization Job Title Outcome Count




Party Secretary promotion 1




Vice Party Secretary horizontal 1
省 省政府 侨务办公室主任 Province 
Political Consultative 








办公室主任/副主任 Province Leading Group for x Office Director/Vice Director horizontal 3
省 省公共资源交易中心 党组书记 Province Public Resources Trading Center Party Secretary horizontal 1








Province State Owned Enterprises
Chairman of the 
Board/CEO/Party Secretary promotion 22







副主任 Province Taihu Lake Water Pollution Prevention 
Office
Vice Director horizontal 1
xx区 党工委副书记/委员/
管理委员会主任
Province X New District
Work Committee Vice 
Director/Committee 
Member/ Director of 
Managing Comission
horizontal 3
Vice Provincial Level City
副省级
市
市委 常委 VP City City Committee Standing Member promotion 9
副省级
市
市委 副秘书长 VP City City Committee Vice Secretary General horizontal 1
副省级
市
市政府 副市长/党组副书记 VP City Government Vice Party Secretary/Vice Mayor promotion 2
Prefectural Level City
地级市 市委 市委副书记 City Party Committee Vice Party Secretary promotion 172
地级市 市委 常委 City Party Committee Standing Member horizontal 46
地级市 市委政法委 副书记 City
Commission for 
Political and Legal 
Affairs
Vice Party Secretary horizontal 3
地级市 市委组织部 部长 City Organization Department Minister horizontal 1
地级市 政府 常务副市长 Government Deputy Vice Mayor promotion/horizontal 9
地级市 政府 副市长/党组成员 City Government Vice Mayor/Committee Member horizontal 15
地级市 政府 党组副书记 City Government Vice Party Secretary horizontal 1








































地级市 总工会 主席 City Worker's Union Chariman retirement 1




City City Committee Party Secretary horizontal 1
地区级
别
单位 具体职务 Location Organization Job Title Outcome Count
Other
X研究院 副院长 Chinese Academy of X Vice Head horizontal 2
x大学 党委书记 X University Party Secretary promotion 3
x学院 党委委员 X School Committee Member horizontal 3
x石油管理局 党委副书记 X Petroleum Administration Vice Party Secretary horizontal 1
正厅级岗位
Duputy Director 
Level Postings promotion 3
副厅级岗位
Vice Duputy Director 




直接退休 Direct Exit exit 60
调查 Investigated exit 42
未知 Unknown unknown 271
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Guide on Categorizing Committee Member Promotions
1. All increases in rank from vice deputy-executive to deputy-executive level;
2. Vice party secretary or deputy vice mayor of prefecture level cities;
3. Vice party secretary or deputy vice director of important provincial ministries
or departments. A ministry or department is considered important if the
head of that organization is or has been a standing member of the provincial
committee;
4. Vice party secretary or deputy vice director of deputy-executive level min-
istries or departments in the center.
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Tables
Table 3.4: Regression analysis on assignment timing
Dependent variable:
Number of new appointments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PS entry year 1.513*** 1.526*** 1.409*** 1.684*** 1.261***
(0.224) (0.222) (0.218) (0.245) (0.311)
PS entry year + 1 0.231 0.395* 0.243 0.471* 0.464
(0.230) (0.231) (0.226) (0.259) (0.321)
PS entry year + 2 -0.165 0.106 0.217 -0.117 0.160
(0.241) (0.241) (0.233) (0.271) (0.336)
Constant 1.562*** 1.922*** 2.305*** 2.726** 1.702*
(0.558) (0.570) (0.647) (1.137) (0.947)
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
National Congress Yes Yes
Year FE Yes
City x National Congress Yes
Exclude prev. tenure = 5 Yes
Exclude prev. convicted
Number of observations 840 840 840 840 395
R-square 0.093 0.132 0.216 0.391 0.162
Adjusted R-square 0.038 0.075 0.149 0.158 0.049
Notes: In regression (4), we exclude all assignments by party secretaries whose predeces-
sors stayed for 4 to 6 years, and all assignments by party secretaries whose predecessors
were not documented in our data set.
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Table 3.5: Logit analysis on chance for promotion on committee members
Dependent variable:
Committee member promotion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PS out 0.048 0.003 -0.145 -0.124 -0.166 -0.404**
(0.152) (0.154) (0.170) (0.155) (0.157) (0.176)
PS promotion 0.205 0.264 0.154 0.200 0.259 0.146
(0.163) (0.165) (0.191) (0.163) (0.165) (0.192)
Start age -0.072*** -0.069*** -0.077** -0.070*** -0.066*** -0.075***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015)
Education -
bachelors
0.037 0.075 0.049 0.081
(0.226) (0.244) (0.226) (0.245)
Education - masters 0.236* 0.300** 0.233* 0.304**
(0.137) (0.145) (0.138) (0.146)
Female -0.352* -0.366* -0.341* -0.351*
(0.201) (0.208) (0.201) (0.208)
Han -0.150 -0.032 -0.157 -0.016
(0.534) (0.555) (0.535) (0.558)
Same province 0.120 0.173 0.108 0.165
(0.136) (0.144) (0.136) (0.145)
InSync -0.130 -0.192
(0.126) (0.128)
Step function Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic function Yes Yes Yes
City FE Yes Yes
Number of
observations
4698 4624 4624 4698 4624 4624
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Table 3.6: Alternative specifications of the multinomial logit regression
Dependent variable:
Committee member promotion
(A) Group by start age: All ≤ 48 > 48
(1) (2) (3)
PS out -0.155 -0.204 -0.165
(0.171) (0.213) (0.315)
PS promotion 0.175 0.294 -0.007
(0.193) (0.242) (0.377)
(B) Exclude province: GD ZJ FJ JS SD
(4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PS out -0.122 -0.137 -0.250 -0.143 -0.083
(0.196) (0.190) (0.181) (0.197) (0.197)
PS promotion 0.190 0.024 0.196 0.506** -0.028
(0.216) (0.223) (0.202) (0.225) (0.219)
(C) Vary promotion definition: P1+C1 P1+C2 P2+C1 P2+C2
(9) (10) (11) (12)
PS out -0.155 -0.184 0.080 -0.049
(0.171) (0.137) (0.200) (0.162)
PS promotion 0.175 0.150 -0.260 -0.124
(0.193) (0.160) (0.197) (0.160)
Notes: Only estimations of V% for key variables are presented here. In part (A), we
use the median start age of 48 as the cutoff for the two age cohorts. In part (B), (4)
excludes Guangdong (GD), (5) excludes Zhejiang (ZJ), (6) excludes Fujian (FJ), (7)
excludes Jiangsu (JS), and (8) excludes Shandong (SD). In part (C), P1 and C1 are the
baseline definitions of promotion for the party secretary and the committee member.
C2 and P2 broadens the definition to include horizontal movements of party secretaries
and standing committee members.
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Table 3.7: Multinomial logit analysis on chance for exit on committee members
Dependent variable:
Committee member promotion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PS out 0.303* 0.224 0.199 0.056 -0.018 -0.138
(0.163) (0.166) (0.184) (0.167) (0.171) (0.193)
PS promotion 0.091 0.091 0.114 0.118 0.121 0.153
(0.159) (0.163) (0.193) (0.160) (0.163) (0.195)
Start age 0.283*** 0.286*** 0.300*** 0.295*** 0.300*** 0.315***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022)
Education - bachelors 0.082 0.136 0.069 0.121
(0.181) (0.200) (0.182) (0.202)
Education - masters 0.069 0.074 0.140 0.131
(0.136) (0.147) (0.137) (0.149)
Female -0.039 -0.074 -0.050 -0.096
(0.232) (0.242) (0.234) (0.244)
Han -0.700 -0.529 -0.757 -0.553
(0.475) (0.486) (0.475) (0.487)
InSync -0.040 -0.135
(0.137) (0.139)
Step function Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic function Yes Yes Yes
City FE Yes Yes
Number of observations 4698 4624 4624 4698 4624 4624
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PS out 0.035 0.006 -0.217 0.120 -0.158 -
0.458**
(0.186) (0.188) (0.207) (0.194) (0.196) (0.218)
PS promotion -0.084 -0.107 0.064 -0.072 -0.095 0.085
(0.224) (0.228) (0.255) (0.224) (0.228) (0.256)
Start age -0.019 -0.011 -0.018 -0.015 -0.006 -0.013
(0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019)
Education - bachelors 0.580* 0.453 0.596** 0.465
(0.304) (0.316) (0.304) (0.317)
Education - masters 0.047 0.041 0.059 0.054
(0.160) (0.168) (0.160) (0.168)
Female -0.041 0.032 -0.040 0.036
(0.231) (0.236) (0.231) (0.236)
Han 0.781 1.006 0.759 1.012
(1.018) (1.029) (1.018) (1.030)
InSync -0.241 -0.309*
(0.159) (0.161)
Step function Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic function Yes Yes Yes
City FE Yes Yes
Number of observations 4698 4624 4624 4698 4624 4624
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Figures
Figure 3.3: Ranking system of civil servants
Note: The figure plots the full distribution of the number of
committee member assignments each party secretary makes
while in office. The average number of assignments is 6.2
and the median is 6.
Figure 3.4: Histogram of the number of connections
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Note: The figure plots the percentage of party secretaries
with varying tenure. The majority of the party secretaries
(63.6%) has a tenure of less than 4 years, 28.2% has a
standard tenure between 4 and 6 years, and 8.1% stays for
more than 6 years. Left and right truncated party secretaries
are excluded from the figure.
Figure 3.5: Histogram of party secretary’s tenure
Note: The figure shows the number of new assignments for
each half year after the party secretary’s assignment. In
terms of total count, 45.8% of assignments to the standing
committee took place within the first year of the party
secretary’s assignment, and 65.0% took place within the
first two years. Left truncated individuals are excluded from
this analysis.
Figure 3.6: Committee member’s assignment timing
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Note: The figure shows the correlation between the previous
party secretary’s tenure and the number of new committee
member assignments within the first year of the current
party secretary. There is significant variation in the number
of new assignments, but previous leader tenure does not
seem to be a determining factor.
Figure 3.7: Impact of previous party secretary’s tenure on new assignments
Note: The figure shows the average exit rate of standing
committee members relative to the exit timing the of the
connected party secretary. The turnover is highest right
after the party secretary leaves office: 17.5% of the standing
committee exit within half a year and 28.8% exit within a
year.
Figure 3.8: Committee member exit timing relative to the exit of the connected
party secretary
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Note: The figure shows the average exit rate of standing
committee members grouped by the length of tenure of
their connected leader. Regardless of the length of the party
secretary’s tenure, we observe the highest turnover rate after
the connected leader leaves office.
Figure 3.9: Committee member exit rate by leader tenure
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